Animals in UK Law

The second legal error was that he did not apply the "single animal" test required by the guidance to what he found had actually occurred. It is clear from his findings in paragraphs 5.C.15 to 19 and 5.C.39 to 46 that the procedures had in fact resulted in a major departure from the usual state of health or well-being of a small number of animals. In consequence, he reached a conclusion which in my judgment was clearly wrong on that issue.

The BUAV criticised Dr Richmond's silence on the apparent lack of post-operative overnight monitoring of these animals and of others. Professor Flecknell and Dr Lewis, who has advised the BUAV, agree that in the case of these and other animals if there was no overnight monitoring the care provided was less than optimum.

In practice section 2 (1) has a very narrow scope, being almost entirely limited to incidents in (or following escapes from) zoos or circuses. Section 2(2) has to cover the whole range of incidents involving animals of species classified as non-dangerous (which I will call domesticated animals, although that is not an entirely accurate term).

The Section is very cumbrously worded and will give rise to several difficulties in future. Those circumstances are "particular circumstances" within Section 2(2) (b). It was "due" to those circumstances that the damage was likely to be severe if an untruder did enter on its territory. Section 2(2)(c): Those characteristics were known to the keeper. It follows that the keeper of the dog is strictly liable unless he can bring himself within one of the exceptions in Section 5.

Yet the nature of the claimants' case is to challenge a composite scientific judgment based more upon an expert analysis of scientific material than upon the application of hard-edged terms of a document amenable to lawyers' construction. The scientific judgment is not immune from lawyers' analysis. But the court must be careful not to substitute its own inexpert view of the science for a tenable expert opinion.

Before this hearing the claims of the First to Seventh Claimants were the subject of a settlement made between them, IAH and Merial, with the result that they no longer pursue claims against any of the Defendants. The First to Seventh Claimants are all farmers whose livestock was culled, either because the animals were infected or because they were suspected of being infected.

Mr Thatcher's submission that the need for an application under section 20(1) may only arise long after the 6 months have elapsed since the act of seizure may well be true. The example in his written submissions is of a stallion which is suffering and is seized but it later becomes necessary to geld the stallion because it has become a danger to either other horses, to those looking after it, or to itself.