Banking in UK Law

The exception for fraud on the part of the beneficiary seeking to avail himself of the credit is a clear application of the maxim ex turpi causa non oritur actio or, if plain English is to be preferred, "fraud unravels all". The courts will not allow their process to be used by a dishonest person to carry out a fraud.

In those circumstances, our ability to do the job effectively would be even more restricted than if we had assumed the role officially from the outset. This is because we have to be satisfied under our new legislation not only that an institution will be prudently run but that it will be run with integrity—and our experiences with BCCI in the past make such a judgment difficult.

And to load a plaintiff/depositor with the further burden of proving that, despite the regulator's self-imposed ignorance, it foresaw damage in the particular form in which it occurred seems to me, with respect, even more illogical and unjust in a common law remedy the purpose of which is to provide a remedy for abuse of public duty.

What facts ought to be known to the banker, i.e. what inquiries he should make, and what facts are sufficient to cause him reasonably to suspect that the customer la not the true owner, must depend upon current banking practice, and change as that practice changes.

What he contends is that this court is entitled to examine that practice, and to form its own opinion as to whether it does comply with the standard of care which a prudent banker should adopt. This is quite right, but I venture to think that this court should be hesitant before condemning as negligent a practice generally adopted by those engaged in banking business.

As to the effect of the ruling in the present case, in my judgment, it is clear that the Court of Justice concluded that the words "debt collection" in the carve out have a meaning capable of being applied to "transactions concerning payments" within the exemption in article 13B(d)(3) (judgment, paragraph 28, last sentence). It then has to be decided whether the actual transaction in question falls within the exemption or the carve out, and this will depend on its precise facts.

In these circumstances, it is right that we should ask ourselves: why do we feel that it would be unjust to allow restitution in cases such as these? The answer must be that, where an innocent defendant's position is so changed that he will suffer an injustice if called upon to repay or to repay in full, the injustice of requiring him so to repay outweighs the injustice of denying the plaintiff restitution.