Burial in UK Law

The decisions summarised above illustrate the versatility of Article 8 ECHR, together with the difficulty of drawing a clear boundary between its private and family life dimensions in certain factual contexts. While each belongs to its discrete factual context, these decisions nonetheless illustrate that matters relating to death, burial, mourning and associated rites have been held to fall within the ambit of Article 8.

After considering the point overnight, the learned Judge ruled that such evidence could not be called.After considering the point overnight, the learned Judge ruled that such evidence could not be called. He accepted that if it were relevant, such evidence would be admissible. He accepted that if it were relevant, such evidence would be admissible.

But three things may be said about it, which its author would surely not have denied: first that, since it is a classification of convenience, there may well be purposes which do not fit neatly into one or other of the headings: secondly, that the words used must not be given the force of a statute to be construed; and thirdly, that the law of charity is a moving subject which may well have evolved even since 1891.

In this context I find it of significance that Parliament in 1902 by the Cremation Act of that year placed cremation, as a public service, on the same footing as burial.

The leading case is now Buchanan v Milton [1999] 2 FLR 844. That was a case where the applicant was the natural mother of the deceased. The respondents were persons who were entitled to the grant of letters of administration of the estate. They were his adoptive mother and the mother of his daughter. The dispute arose because the applicant had given her consent to adoption when the deceased was only four days old.

Hale J set out six special circumstances in terms of the requirements of section 116 of the Supreme Court Act.

In short it seems to me that there are three points which arise from the above analysis. First, there is a clear conceptual distinction between openness and visual impact. Secondly, it is therefore is wrong in principle to arrive at a specific conclusion as to openness by reference to visual impact.