Cargo in UK Law

But, and I do not think that sufficient recognition to this has been given in the courts below, it is a time bar of a special kind, viz., one which extinguishes the claim (cf. Article 29 of the Warsaw Convention 1929) not one which, as most English Statutes of Limitation (e.g. the Limitation Act 1939, The Maritime Conventions Act 1911), and some international Conventions (e.g. the Brussels Convention on Collisions 1910 Article 7) do, bars the remedy while leaving the claim itself in existence.

While deprecating the extension of the use of the expression "purposive construction" from the interpretation of statutes to the interpretation of private contracts, I agree with the passage I have cited from the arbitrators' award and I take this opportunity of re-stating that if detailed semantic and syntactical analysis of words in a commercial contract is going to lead to a conclusion that flouts business commonsense, it must be made to yield to business commonsense.

It is frequently very difficult to tell whether a witness is telling the truth or not; and where there is a conflict of evidence such as there was in the present case, reference to the objective facts and documents, to the witnesses' motives, and to the overall probabilities, can be of very great assistance to a judge in ascertaining the truth.

In my opinion that principle applies to a creditor who has a right to be paid the debt owing to his even before he has established his right by getting judgment for it. If it appears that the debt is due and owing — and there is a danger that the debtor may dispose of his assets so as to defeat it before judgment — the Court has jurisdiction in a proper case to grant an interlocutory judgment so as to prevent his disposing of those assets.

I can see a possibility of success of the agency argument if (first) the Bill of Lading makes it clear that the stevedore is intended to be protected by the provisions in it which limit liability, (secondly) the Bill of Lading makes it clear that the carrier, in addition to contracting for these provisions on his own behalf, is also contracting as agent for the stevedore that these provisions should apply to the stevedore, (thirdly) the carrier has authority from the stevedore to do that, or perhaps later ratification by the stevedore would suffice, and (fourthly) that any difficulties about consideration moving from the stevedore were overcome.

My Lords, it is, I think, permissible in a consideration of this commercial transaction to ask what possible difference it makes to the charterers whether the delay, to which their loss is due, occurs when the ship is in ballast or is loaded with a cargo of oil or of water. It matters not for this purpose whether the charter-party was for a single voyage, as the original document seemed to contemplate, or for a number of consecutive voyages.

A right to obtain an interlocutory injunction is not a cause of action. It is dependent upon there being a pre-existing cause of action against the defendant arising out of an invasion, actual or theatened by him, of a legal or equitable right of the plaintiff for the enforcement of which the defendant is amenable to the jurisdiction of the court. The right to obtain an interlocutory injunction is merely ancillary and incidental to the pre-existing cause of action.