Charity in UK Law

In every such case the Court would be acting upon the basis that the property affected is not in the beneficial ovmership of the persons or body in whom its legal ownership is vested but is devoted to charitable purposes, that is to say, is held upon charitable trusts.

But three things may be said about it, which its author would surely not have denied: first that, since it is a classification of convenience, there may well be purposes which do not fit neatly into one or other of the headings: secondly, that the words used must not be given the force of a statute to be construed; and thirdly, that the law of charity is a moving subject which may well have evolved even since 1891.

Under English law charity has always received special treatment. It is therefore subject to special rules governing registration, administration, taxation and duration. Although not a state institution, a charity is subject to the constitutional protection of the Crown as parens patriae, acting through HM Attorney-General, to the state supervision of the Charity Commissioners and to the judicial supervision of this Court.

My Lords, there are, I think, two propositions which must ever be borne in mind in any case in which the question is whether a trust is charitable. The first is that it is still the general law that a trust is not charitable and entitled to the privileges which charity confers, unless it is within the spirit and intendment of the preamble to the Statute of Elizabeth, ( 43 Eliz. c. 4), which is expressly preserved by S. 13(2) of the Mortmain and Charitable Uses Act, 1888.

The sum, in my opinion, is in no different position from a sum (having the requisite quality of recurrence) paid without conditions or counter stipulations out of taxed income under a covenant by a private individual to any charitable body. The Crown would neither admit nor deny that such a payment would be an annual payment to the charity within the meaning of Case III, or that the party paying it would be entitled to retain the tax, or that the charity would be entitled to recover it.

For example, a bridge which is available for all the public may undoubtedly be a charity and it is indifferent how many people use it. But confine its use to a selected number of persons however numerous and important: it is then clearly not a charity. It is not of general public utility: for it does not serve the public purpose which its nature qualifies it to serve.

"Charity", says Lord Macnaghten at p. 583, "in its legal sense comprises four principal divisions�trusts for the relief of poverty: trusts for the advancement of education: trusts for the advancement of religion: and trusts for other purposes beneficial to the community not falling under any of the preceding heads." I cannot, however, find that such a contention has been put forward.