Charity in UK Law

It is a function of the Crown as parens patriae to ensure the due administration of established charities and the proper application of funds devoted to charitable purposes. In such cases the relief granted often takes the form of an Order approving a scheme for the administration of the charity which has been laid before the Court, but this is not the only way in which the Court can exercise jurisdiction in respect of a charity or over charity trustees.

Under English law charity has always received special treatment. It often takes the form of a trust; but it is a public trust for the promotion of purposes beneficial to the community, not a trust for private individuals. Although not a state institution, a charity is subject to the constitutional protection of the Crown as parens patriae, acting through HM Attorney-General, to the state supervision of the Charity Commissioners and to the judicial supervision of this Court.

The sum, in my opinion, is in no different position from a sum (having the requisite quality of recurrence) paid without conditions or counter stipulations out of taxed income under a covenant by a private individual to any charitable body. The Crown would neither admit nor deny that such a payment would be an annual payment to the charity within the meaning of Case III, or that the party paying it would be entitled to retain the tax, or that the charity would be entitled to recover it.

The member does not have a free vote in this case because he is bound by the fiduciary duties I have described and is subject to the court's inherent jurisdiction over the administration of charities. When the court has decided what is expressly in the best interests of a charity, a member would not be acting in the best interests of that charity if he gainsaid that decision.

I should not leave this aspect of the matter without emphasising the specific nature of the decision I have reached, and the exceptional character of this case. I have looked at numerous charities' cases over three centuries and the present position has not arisen before. For that reason, the only remaining voting member of CIFF must be directed to approve it, otherwise the essential interests of charity which the court is there to protect would be put at risk.

In order to come within the Act the grant has to be for one or more of the three purposes mentioned in section 2 i.e. for the education of poor persons, or for the residence of a schoolmaster or schoolmistress, or otherwise for the purposes of the education of such poor persons in religious and useful knowledge. But the Act does not expressly or impliedly require the grant either to be for all of those purposes or to be for purposes expressed in those very words.

As the argument before us proceeded, it became increasingly evident that there are insuperable difficulties in attempting a comprehensive definition. We accept that there may be cases where an actual or potential beneficiary under a nationwide charity will qualify as a person interested in that charity. But we do not accept that an actual or potential beneficiary will always qualify.