Clearance in UK Law

The most that can be extracted from the two cases is that the desirability of preserving an existing use of land is a consideration material to be taken into account under that subsection, provided there is a reasonable probability that such use will be preserved if permission for the new use is refused.

The simple proposition which should not be lost sight of is that the use for which a planning permission is granted must be ascertained by interpreting the words in the planning permission itself. If the permitted use has been implemented, and a change to the permitted use takes place, then it will be a question of fact and degree whether that change is a material change of use.

However it is important under the CPR to have in mind the overriding principles when considering whether to lift an order made under CPR 31.22. The most important consideration must be the interest of justice which involves considering the interest of the party seeking to use the documents and that of the party protected by the CPR 31.22 order. As Lord Oliver said each case will depend upon its own facts.

In consequence, I consider that the 2014 permission was ambiguous on its face. Despite the stated approval of the variation of the condition as to use, which restricted sale to non-food goods, the "Conditions" in the permission did not include any condition restricting use to the sale of non-food goods. Because of the ambiguity I conclude that it is permissible to consider the 1985 and 2010 permissions, and application for the variation in 2014.

Each case will turn on its own merits, but the importance of the project or proposal, its desirability in the public interest, are undoubtedly matters to be weighed. In striking the balance, the likelihood of use A actually coming about is doubtless a highly material consideration.

In my judgment everything points to the 2003 grant being one of permission to use the land as a travelling showpeoples' site. Not only is this what was applied for, and was granted in the short description, it is also consistent with the conditions which I have set out in paragraph 6 of this judgment. Nowhere is it described as a residential caravan site, nor are the conditions taken as a whole appropriate for such a site.

Supposing then upon its true construction the notice was hopelessly ambiguous and uncertian so that the owner or occupier could not tell in what srespect it was alleged that he had developed the land without permission or in what respect it was alleged that he had failed to comply with a breach of condition or, again, that he could not tell with reasonable certainkty what steps he had to take to remedy the alleged branches.