Conflict and Wars in UK Law

These can properly be regarded as indiscriminate in the sense that, albeit they may have specific or general targets, they inevitably expose the ordinary civilian who happens to be at the scene to what has been described in argument as collateral damage. The means adopted may be bombs, which can affect others besides the target, or shootings, which produce a lesser but nonetheless real risk of collateral damage.

The CJEU requires us to decide whether the degree of indiscriminate violence characterising the armed conflict taking place reaches such a high level as to show the existence for an ordinary civilian of a real risk of serious harm in the country or in a particular region. When we refer below to the “Article 15(c) threshold”, this is what we have in mind. Thus it is necessary to assess whether the level of violence is such as to meet the test.

In HM1 at [73] the Tribunal decided that an attempt to distinguish between a real risk of targeted and incidental killing of civilians during armed conflict was not a helpful exercise. We agree, but in assessing whether the risk reaches the level required by the CJEU, focus on the evidence about the numbers of civilians killed or wounded is obviously of prime importance. Thus we have been told that each death can be multiplied up to seven times when considering injuries to bystanders.

Such violence is indiscriminate in effect even if not necessarily in aim.

The Tribunal received considerable oral and written submissions on one particular issue of subsidiary protection, as provided in Chapter V of Council Directive 2004/83/EC (“the Qualification Directive”): the risk of suffering the form of serious harm identified in article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive, namely, a serious and individual threat to a civilian's life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict.

Nor, however, has the judgment introduced an additional test of exceptionality. By using the words “exceptional” and “exceptionally” it is simply stressing that it is not every armed conflict or violent situation which will attract the protection of article 15(c), but only one where the level of violence is such that, without anything to render them a particular target, civilians face real risks to their life or personal safety.

Warfare perhaps never did admit of such a distinction, but now it would be quite absurd.