Demolition in UK Law

Leading Cases
  • Almond v Ash Brothers & Heaton Ltd ; Dawkins (Valuation Officer) v Ash Bros & Heaton Ltd
    • House of Lords
    • 26 Mar 1969

    The question here is whether reduction in value due to an impending demolition order comes within that area of rating where realities are acknowledged or within that where necessarily fiction prevails over fact. It is near the border-line which separates those areas. One has a natural inclination to prefer reality to fiction if and where this is compatible with the basis of rating, with the statute, and with the cases.

    Rating seeks a standard by which every hereditament in this country can be measured in relation to every other hereditament. But one only excludes the human realities to a limited and necessary extent, since it is only the human realities that give any value at all to hereditaments. They are excluded in so far as they are accidental to the letting of a hereditament. They are acknowledged in so far as they are essential to the hereditament itself.

    The principle was mainly devised to meet, and it does deal with, an obvious type of case where the character or condition of the property either has undergone a change or is about to do so: thus, a house in course of construction cannot be rated: nor can a building be rated by reference to changes which might be made in it either as to its structure or its use.

  • Walker v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government
    • Queen's Bench Division
    • 24 Ene 2008

    The former concerned the acquisition of land, its reclamation improvement or refurbishment, for a purpose namely: redevelopment for residential or mixed use. The latter provides for the acquisition of buildings and their demolition, conversion, or improvement. Buildings are described as “intended for residential or mixed use”. That would include buildings currently used for such purposes or buildings which at one stage had been but had ceased to be so used.

  • Fairmount Investments Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment
    • House of Lords
    • 24 Jun 1976

    But in this case I am unable, consonant with the essential principles of fairness in a dispute, to uphold this compulsory purchase order. All cases in which principles of natural justice are invoked must depend on the particular circumstances of the cases. I can only say that in my opinion, in the circumstances I have outline, Fairmount has not had—in a phrase whose derivation neither I nor your Lordships could trace—a fair crack of the whip.

  • Windsor and Maidenhead Royal Borough Council v Brandrose Investments Ltd
    • Court of Appeal
    • 27 Ene 1983

    Section 52 (1) empowers a local planning authority to make agreements to achieve ends which it could not achieve without the consent of an applicant for planning permission. As we have already pointed out, subsection (l) confers powers which are merely incidental to the granting of planning permission. It is trite law that a statutory body which has public duties to perform (and a local planning authority is such a body) cannot lawfully agree not to exercise its powers.

  • Re Stalybridge and Compulsory Purchase Order, 1963; Ashbridge Investments Ltd v Minister of Housing and Local Government
    • Court of Appeal
    • 02 Jul 1965

    Under this Section it seems to me that the Court can interferewith the Minister's decision if he has acted on no evidence; or if he has come to a conclusion to which on the evidence he could not reasonably come; or if he has given a wrong interpretation to the words of the Statute; or if he has taken into consideration matters which he ought not to have taken into account, or vice versa; or has otherwise gone wrong in law.

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