Education in UK Law

There is no Convention guarantee of education at or by a particular institution. The test, as always under the Convention, is a highly pragmatic one, to be applied to the specific facts of the case: have the authorities of the state acted so as to deny to a pupil effective access to such educational facilities as the state provides for such pupils?

The correct approach is first to ask whether there was a denial of a Convention right. In the case of article 2 of the First Protocol, that would have required a systemic failure of the educational system which resulted in the respondent not having access to a minimum level of education. As there was no such failure, that is the end of the matter.

The realistic principle that, subject to the Convention's own limits, the right to education takes the form prescribed in each member state carries in my judgment the necessary corollary that any question whether there has been a violation of the right has to be answered initially in terms of the applicable domestic law.

It would appear, therefore, than there is a discretion in the local education authority which they must exercise in accordance with the terms of the statute: and there is also a duty laid upon them by section 40 (2) of the Act of 1944 to take stops prescribed in that section in the circumstances therein laid down if in their view, there is a breach of any order siade by the?

In order to come within the Act the grant has to be for one or more of the three purposes mentioned in section 2 i.e. for the education of poor persons, or for the residence of a schoolmaster or schoolmistress, or otherwise for the purposes of the education of such poor persons in religious and useful knowledge.

The evidence indicates that there have been occasions of Hindu and Sikh families not sending their children to school in Afghanistan, especially girls, as a result of the fear of harassment and ill-treatment which is corroborated by the evidence. However, this is a fact sensitive issue that must be considered in each case.

The ensuing words "and with' a view to furthering this object" must refer back to both the first and second parts envisaged as defining a composite object to which all that follows in sub-clauses (i) to (iv) is subordinate. The learned judge, apparently confining his attention to the first part, declared that this was "on its face simply a trust to promote the playing of games."