Entertainment and Media in UK Law

As to the first ground, I do not think the reasonable man—who can also be described as an ordinary sensible man—should be envisaged as reading this article carefully. The ordinary, sensible man, if he read the article at all, would be likely to skim through it casually and not to give it concentrated attention or a second reading. It is no part of his work to read this article, nor does he have to base any practical decision on what he reads there.

Then there is the alleged right to a free flow of information, or the right to know. Your Lordships will perceive without any demonstration from me that use of the word "right" here will not conduce to an understanding of the legal position. But there is a wide difference between what is interesting to the public and what it is in the public interest to make known.

They seem to me to point to a very reasonable principle that if through no fault of his own a person gets mixed up in the tortious acts of others so as to facilitate their wrong-doing he may incur no personal liability but he comes under a duty to assist the person who has been wronged by giving him full information and disclosing the identity of the wrongdoers.

There is no definition in the books as to what is a matter of public interest. All we are given is a list of examples, coupled with the statement that it is for the Judge and not for the jury. Whenever a matter is such as to affect people at large, so that they may be legitimately interested in, or concerned at, what is going on; or what may happen to them or to others; then it is a matter of public interest on which everyone is entitled to make fair comment.

Compulsion is an invasion of a private right to keep one's documents to oneself. The public interest in privacy and confidence demands that this compulsion should not be pressed further than the course of justice requires. In order to encourage openness and fairness, the public interest requires that documents disclosed on discovery are not to be made use of except for the purposes of the action in which they are disclosed.

Discovery constitutes a very serious invasion of the privacy and confidentiality of a litigant's affairs. It forms part of English legal procedure because the public interest in securing that justice is done between parties is considered to outweigh the private and public interest in the maintenance of confidentiality.

I have pointed out earlier in this judgment that the basis of the defence of public interest in a breach of confidence action cannot be the same as the basis of such defence to an action for infringement of copyright. In an action for breach of confidence the foundation of the action can fall away if that is required in the public interest, but that can never happen in a copyright action.