Estates in UK Law

Further, it is not necessary for the landlords to prove that the conclusions which led then to refuse consent were justified, if they were conclusions which might be reached by a reasonable man in the circumstances; see Shanly v. Ward (supra); Premier Confectionary (London) ( Company v. London Commercial Sale Rooms Limited 1933 Chancery Division, page 904 at pages 912 and 913) per Mr Justice Bennett; Town Investments Limited Underlease (supra) at page 315.

This is so though the trader may desire to acquire the property for the purpose of providing himself with circulating capital by mining operations on the property acquired even if he is intending to acquire the property only for a short time, see Knight v. Calder Grove Estates 35 T.C. 447.

First, it was possible to determine from a consideration of the provisions of the Act read as a whole precisely what the mischief was that it was the purpose of the Act to remedy; secondly, it was apparent that the draftsman and Parliament had by inadvertence overlooked, and so omitted to deal with, an eventuality that required to be dealt with if the purpose of the Act was to be achieved; and thirdly, it was possible to state with certainty what were the additional words that would have been inserted by the draftsman and approved by Parliament had their attention been drawn to the omission before the Bill passed into law.

As will be apparent from my earlier analysis of Tandon, I cannot agree that Lord Roskill regarded "external and internal physical character and appearance" as the determining factors. I agree with the Master of the Rolls that the terms of the lease as such should not have been treated as the major factor.

The general presumption is that the parties have expressed every material term which they intended should govern their agreement, whether oral or in writing. But it is well recognised that there may be cases where obviously some term must be implied if the intention of the parties is not to be defeated, some term of which it can be predicated that "it goes without saying", some term not expressed but necessary to give to the transaction such business efficacy as the parties must have intended.

It is a principle not by any means to be whittled down that the subject's recourse to Her Majesty's courts for the determination of his rights is not to be excluded except by clear words. That is, as Mr. Justice McNair called it in Francis v. Yiewsley and West Drayton Urban District Council [1957] 2 Q.B. 136, a "fundamental rule" from which I would not for my part sanction any departure.

But I do not think they do lay down any propositions of law, and for this reason:- The words of the contract are perfectly clear English words: "such licence shall not be unreasonably withheld". When those words come to be applied in any particular case, I do not think the Court can, or should, determine by strict rules the grounds on which a landlord may, or may not, reasonably refuse his consent. He is not limited by the contract to any particular grounds.