Estates in UK Law

The modern approach to statutory construction is to have regard to the purpose of a particular provision and interpret its language, so far as possible, in a way which best gives effect to that purpose.

This is so though the trader may desire to acquire the property for the purpose of providing himself with circulating capital by mining operations on the property acquired even if he is intending to acquire the property only for a short time, see Knight v. Calder Grove Estates 35 T.C. 447.

First, it was possible to determine from a consideration of the provisions of the Act read as a whole precisely what the mischief was that it was the purpose of the Act to remedy; secondly, it was apparent that the draftsman and Parliament had by inadvertence overlooked, and so omitted to deal with, an eventuality that required to be dealt with if the purpose of the Act was to be achieved; and thirdly, it was possible to state with certainty what were the additional words that would have been inserted by the draftsman and approved by Parliament had their attention been drawn to the omission before the Bill passed into law.

What is the agreement causing loss on which Britel and Meretz rely as amounting to the conspiracy? The answer, as it seems to me, must be the Wrap Around Agreement and the subsequent implementation of the steps it contemplated. Underlying the whole of the allegation is the exercise by FP of its power of sale in circumstances in which the obligation of ACP to make further commission payments to Meretz would never arise; and Britel would not be able to enforce the Lease-Back Option.

The general presumption is that the parties have expressed every material term which they intended should govern their agreement, whether oral or in writing. But it is well recognised that there may be cases where obviously some term must be implied if the intention of the parties is not to be defeated, some term of which it can be predicated that "it goes without saying", some term not expressed but necessary to give to the transaction such business efficacy as the parties must have intended.

It is a principle not by any means to be whittled down that the subject's recourse to Her Majesty's courts for the determination of his rights is not to be excluded except by clear words. That is, as Mr. Justice McNair called it in Francis v. Yiewsley and West Drayton Urban District Council [1957] 2 Q.B. 136, a "fundamental rule" from which I would not for my part sanction any departure.

As was said by the Court, at page 136A: "Similar words in deeds and wills have frequently been held to create a life interest determinable (apart from the special considerations introduced by the Settled Land Act, 1925) on the beneficiary ceasing to occupy the premises."