Estates in UK Law

The modern approach to statutory construction is to have regard to the purpose of a particular provision and interpret its language, so far as possible, in a way which best gives effect to that purpose.

This is so though the trader may desire to acquire the property for the purpose of providing himself with circulating capital by mining operations on the property acquired even if he is intending to acquire the property only for a short time, see Knight v. Calder Grove Estates 35 T.C. 447.

Mr Martin also submits that the reference in s.82(3) to overriding interests is inconsistent with the notion that a claim to rectification is itself an overriding interest. The answer to this point is, as I see it, that the right to claim rectification must be coupled with actual occupation for the saving in section 82(3) to apply. Accordingly, the interpretation of "overriding interest"which I prefer is not precluded by section 82(3).

What is the agreement causing loss on which Britel and Meretz rely as amounting to the conspiracy? The answer, as it seems to me, must be the Wrap Around Agreement and the subsequent implementation of the steps it contemplated. Underlying the whole of the allegation is the exercise by FP of its power of sale in circumstances in which the obligation of ACP to make further commission payments to Meretz would never arise; and Britel would not be able to enforce the Lease-Back Option.

First, it was possible to determine from a consideration of the provisions of the Act read as a whole precisely what the mischief was that it was the purpose of the Act to remedy; secondly, it was apparent that the draftsman and Parliament had by inadvertence overlooked, and so omitted to deal with, an eventuality that required to be dealt with if the purpose of the Act was to be achieved; and thirdly, it was possible to state with certainty what were the additional words that would have been inserted by the draftsman and approved by Parliament had their attention been drawn to the omission before the Bill passed into law.

As was said by the Court, at page 136A: "Similar words in deeds and wills have frequently been held to create a life interest determinable (apart from the special considerations introduced by the Settled Land Act, 1925) on the beneficiary ceasing to occupy the premises."

We have no reason to doubt Peter Smith J's conclusions but in any event, as he observed, section 114 provides for a transfer "unless a contrary intention is expressed" in the mortgage. Thus if section 114 applies, all depends upon the true construction of the mortgage and, in our judgment, for the reasons given earlier, on the true construction of the sub-charge, there was no such transfer in this case.