Formation of Partnership in UK Law

What he receives out of the partnership funds falls to be brought into account in ascertaining his share of the profits of the firm except in so far he can demonstrate that it represents a payment to him in reimbursement of sums expended by him on partnership purposes in the carrying on of the partnership business or practice — the example was given in the course of argument of the partner travelling to and staying in Edinburgh on the business of the firm — or a payment entirely collateral made to him otherwise than in his capacity as a partner (as in Heastie v. Veitch & Co.

While each partner has a proprietary interest in each and every asset, he has no entitlement to any specific asset and, in consequence, no right, without the consent of the other partners or partner, to require the whole or even a share of any particular asset to be vested in him.

That is because in law an individual cannot be an employee of himself. Nor can a partner in a partnership be an employee of the partnership, because it is equally not possible for an individual to be an employee of himself and his co-partners (see Cowell v. Quilter Goodison Co Ltd and Q.G. Management Services Ltd [1989] IRLR 392). The statutory hypothesis which the subsection requires in order to answer that question is that A and the other members of the LLP 'were partners in a partnership'.

Fifth, such a trust is akin to a "retention of title" clause, enabling the recipient to have recourse to the payer's money for the particular purpose specified but without entrenching on the payer's property rights more than necessary to enable the purpose to be achieved. It is not as such a "purpose" trust of which the recipient is a trustee, the beneficial interest in the money reverting to the payer if the purpose is incapable of achievement.

In my judgment, therefore, what Belmont and Akindele decide for present purposes is that actual knowledge of circumstances which make the payment a misapplication is sufficient to bind the conscience of the recipient. On my analysis of the essential nature of the second supplementary agreement that, however, is not this case.

It is in the interests of both plaintiffs and the public that litigation should proceed with all diligence. It is in the interest of defendants that they should be able to know when claims against them are statute barred. This type of case, where writs are held for too long and service is attempted in haste within the last week of its validity, continues to arise far too frequently.

It is also immediately plain that the tax avoidance scheme, if it worked, would be singularly attractive to any person in the position of the Claimant, that is, any resident of the UK who, as a self-employed person, carried on a trade or profession here.