Investigation in UK Law

It is the arresting officer's own account of the information which he had which matters, not what was observed by or known to anyone else. It is the arresting officer's own account of the information which he had which matters, not what was observed by or known to anyone else.

I wish to stress, however, that the judge must first be satisfied that the warrant with which he is dealing is a Part 1 warrant within the meaning of section 2(2). A warrant which does not contain the statements referred to in that subsection cannot be eked out by extraneous information. The requirements of section 2(2) are mandatory. If they are not met, the warrant is not a Part 1 warrant and the remaining provisions of that Part of the Act will not apply to it.

The Rules contemplate three stages in the investigations leading up to somebody being brought before a Court for a criminal offence. The first is the gathering of information, and that can be gathered from anybody, including persons in custody provided they have not been charged. At the gathering of information stage no caution of any kind need be administered.

It will be noticed that Mr Justice Horridge relied on the fact that the documents were used in evidence at the trial. But I cannot think that is a necessary condition to justify their seizure. It may often happen that, on investigation, the prosecution decide not to go on with the case. The seizure must be justified at the time, irrespective of whether the case goes to trial or not. It cannot be made lawful or unlawful according to what happens afterwards.

Inthese present times, with the ever-increasing wickness there is about, honest citizens must help the police and not hinder them in their efforts to track down criminals.

Immunities conferred by the law in respect of legal proceedings need always to be checked against a broad view of the public interest. So checked, the present case provides no justification for protecting absolutely what the solicitor said in the court.

Applying, as we do, the principle stated by Pollock B in Vreones, we conclude that an act is not beyond the ambit of those tending to pervert the course of justice by reason of its being performed after the crime but before investigations into the alleged crime have begun. Whether an act has a tendency to pervert the course of justice cannot depend upon whether investigation of the matter which may become the subject of court proceedings has begun.