Legal Aid in UK Law

It is a fundamental condition on which the administration of justice as a whole rests. It is a fundamental condition on which the administration of justice as a whole rests. Legal professional privilege is thus much more than an ordinary rule of evidence, limited in its application to the facts of a particular case. Legal professional privilege is thus much more than an ordinary rule of evidence, limited in its application to the facts of a particular case.

9) The judge should be alert to the possibility that an application against a non-party is motivated by resentment of an inability to obtain an effective order for costs against a legally-aided litigant.

In all such cases I think the courts should - for the purposes of discovery - treat all the persons interested as if they were partners in a single firm or departments in a single company, Each can avail himself of the privilege in aid of litigation. Each can collect information for the use of his or the other's legal adviser.

Their lack of representation will often justify making allowances in making case management decisions and in conducting hearings. But it will not usually justify applying to litigants in person a lower standard of compliance with rules or orders of the court. The overriding objective requires the courts so far as practicable to enforce compliance with the rules: CPR rule 1.1(1)(f). The rules do not in any relevant respect distinguish between represented and unrepresented parties.

In property adjustment proceedings, in my view, it is only property the ownership or transfer of which has been in issue which has been "recovered or preserved" so as to be the subject of a legal aid charge. What has been in issue is to be collected as a matter of fact from pleadings, evidence, judgment and/or order. I can see no reason for extending the words to items of property the ownership or possession of which has never been questioned.

It is incumbent on courts to which applications for wasted costs orders are made to bear prominently in mind the peculiar vulnerability of legal representatives acting for assisted persons, to which Balcombe LJ adverted in Symphony Group and which recent experience abundantly confirms. It would subvert the benevolent purposes of this legislation if such representatives were subject to any unusual personal risk.

We agree with Mr. Justice Forbes that it is a perfectly legitimate excuse for delay to be able to say that the delay is entirely due to the fact that it takes a certain time for a certificate to be obtained from the legal aid authorities and that, despite all proper endeavours by an applicant, and those advising her, to obtain a legal aid certificate with the utmost urgency, there has been some difficulty about obtaining it through no fault at all of the applicant.