Legal Titles in UK Law

What is crucial is to understand that, without the requisite intention, in law there can be no possession. Such intention may be, and frequently is, deduced from the physical acts themselves. But there is no doubt in my judgment that there are two separate elements in legal possession. It is not the nature of the acts which A does but the intention with which he does them which determines whether or not he is in possession.

It was not a case on the effect of first registration nor was it a case of concurrent registrations. It was held that only the bare legal title passed to the transferee, who was registered as proprietor. The claimant, who had been defrauded, was left with the beneficial ownership of the land and that was held to be sufficient to entitle the claimant in that case to sue for trespass.

It is not perhaps immediately obvious why the authorities have required a trespasser to establish an intention to possess as well as actual possession in order to prove the relevant adverse possession. That does not mean that it must in fact be known to the owner, but that it must be manifested to him so that, if he were present at the property he would be aware that the trespasser had taken possession of it and intended to keep others out.

If the law is to attribute possession of land to a person who can establish no paper title to possession, he must be shown to have both factual possession and the requisite intention to possess (" animus possidendi"). A person claiming to have "dispossessed" another must similarly fulfil both these requirements.

Possession is never "adverse" within the meaning of the 1980 Act if it is enjoyed under a lawful title. If, therefore, a person occupies or uses land by licence of the owner with the paper title and his licence has not been duly determined, he cannot be treated as having been in "adverse possession" as against the owner with the paper title.

In the present case, however, the combination of features listed above means that it cannot have been the object of the contract to transfer property from OWBM to the Owners: both parties knew that this was unlikely ever to happen. Even if it did, because some bunkers remained unconsumed after 60 days, that was not fundamental to the transaction.

Secondly, following the 2003 Agreement, the Company has effectively “stepped into the shoes” of NEL and assumed its rights under the 1999 Agreement. On analogy with Re Lashmar (supra), NEL no longer has any duties to perform.