Local Authority Housing in UK Law

Where the existence or non-existence of a fact is left to the judgment and discretion of a public body and that fact involves a broad spectrum ranging from the obvious to the debatable to the just conceivable, it is the duty of the court to leave the decision of that fact to the public body to whom Parliament has entrusted the decision-making power save in a case where it is obvious that the public body, consciously or unconsciously, are acting perversely.

The first is that the Act is a scheme of social welfare, intended to confer benefits at the public expense on grounds of public policy. Public money is spent on housing the homeless not merely for the private benefit of people who find themselves homeless but on grounds of general public interest: because, for example, proper housing means that people will be less likely to suffer illness, turn to crime or require the attention of other social services.

So long as that place where he eats and sleeps is voluntarily accepted by him, the reason why he is there rather than somewhere else does not prevent that place from being his normal residence. He may not like it, he may prefer some other place, but that place is for the relevant time the place where he normally resides.

Once a decision has been reached by the housing authority which gives rise to the temporary, the limited or the full housing duty, rights and obligations are immediately created in the field of private law. But it is inherent in the scheme of the Act that an appropriate public law decision of the housing authority is a condition precedent to the establishment of the private law duty.

It is impossible to read the words 'a child who is'provided with accommodation by the authority in the exercise of any functions…which are social services functions within the meaning of the Local Authority Social Services Act 1970…' to include a child who has not been drawn to the attention of the local social services authority or provided with any accommodation or other services by that authority.

First, it is designed for the expressed purpose of bringing families together. Secondly, it forms part of a complex of duties which local authorities owe to categories of persons seeking housing. The Act must be interpreted in the light of these matters, with liberality having regard to its social purposes, and also with recognition of the claims of others and the nature and scale of local authorities' responsibilities.

Third, sub-section (1) specifies, again in very broad terms, the manner in which the "general duty" is to be discharged, namely, "by providing a range and level of services appropriate to those children's needs". This language is contemplating the children, the objects of the general duty, as a class.