Operation of the Charity in UK Law

: it is well established that in the case of a gift to a charity (that is, to some body of persons or organization admittedly charitable) where no general charitable intention is present, then (1) if the charity has ceased to exist before the Will comes into operation, the felt lapses; but (2) ii the charity is still in existence at the date mentioned, it is effective as a gift to the extent the interests of the next of kin (or of whoever else take in default of the charitable interest taking effect) are forever excluded notwithstanding the later dissolution or disappearance of the charity.

But the test of vagueness or uncertainty or impracticability is to be applied at the date of the Testator's death; if at that date the disposition is shown to be impracticable (confining myself henceforth to that case) – that is, incapable for any reason of practically initiated or administered then the gift fails altogether and the next-of-kin (or whoever else are entitled in default) take.

"Charity proceedings" are defined in section 33(8) as meaning proceedings in any court (so that includes the County Court) in England or Wales brought under the court's jurisdiction with respect to charities or brought under the court's jurisdiction with respect to trusts in relation to the administration of a trust for charitable purposes. That is to prevent charities from frittering away money subject to charitable trusts in pursuing litigation relating to internal disputes.

Most of the cases which have arisen have been due to a tendency on the part of testators to associate with the word "charitable" other words of vague import. The present is one of these. Here the bequest is in favour of "such charitable institution or institutions or other charitable or benevolent object or objects in England as my acting executors or executor may in their or his absolute discretion select".

To this salutary rule there is a single exception: a testator may validly leave it to his executors to determine what charitable objects shall benefit, so long as charitable and no other objects may benefit. For the Court knows what is charitable by reference to the preamble to the Statute of Elizabeth, to the objects there enumerated and all others which "by analogies are deemed within its spirit and intendment", but what is benevolent the Court knows not.

It remains, however, to consider whether the agreement is made void by section 36(3). As I have said, earlier in this judgment, a contract into which, by virtue of section 36(3) of the Act, it was unlawful for the charity trustees to enter will, prima facie at least, be void for that reason.

I think one has to be careful of the use of the word "beneficiary" in this context. A charitable trust, as such, does not have beneficiaries in the same sense as beneficiaries under a private trust. No individual has any proprietary interest in the charity's assets and funds as such, but a person may become a beneficiary in a loose sense as an object of the charitable trust. The advancing of the Ethiopian Orthodox faith would, in one sense, embrace all those of that faith.