Permits in UK Law

Many landfills have been operating for a substantial period of time and it was in the past considered appropriate to allow leachate to be diluted and dispersed through underlying ground and sometimes thereafter through groundwater. That is not now permitted and should not have been allowed since 1980 when the Groundwater Directive came into force. Landfills are now constructed in cells which have a liner and a mechanism for collecting and removing leachate and gases.

Specific legislative control of landfilling arose under the Control of Pollution Act 1974. Waste Disposal Licences needed to be obtained but, once the filling permitted by the licence was completed, the operator could relinquish the licence and would have no continuing obligation to manage the landfill.

There is no definition of 'stationary technical unit' in the Directive or the Regulations. The meaning suggested in the Government Guidance seems to me to be appropriate. When applied to landfill, I see no reason why in principle a new deposit in a defined area which excludes an old cell should not qualify. I am not persuaded that it is necessary to apply a test of independence.

Again, it seems unnecessary for me to deal with those submissions in detail since, as I understand it, Mr Haddon-Cave QC accepts that there is a duty, as a matter of customary international law, not to recognise the TRNC as legal or lawful. The upshot is, of course, that the United Kingdom Government is under a legal duty not to recognise the TRNC. I have found that the grant of the permits sought by the Claimant would constitute acts of recognition.

The initial burden lies on an applicant to prove the legitimacy of his expectation. This means that in a claim based on a promise, the applicant must prove the promise and that it was clear and unambiguous and devoid of relevant qualification. If he wishes to reinforce his case by saying that he relied on the promise to his detriment, then obviously he must prove that too.

But the discretion must be exercised judicially and in most cases in which a decision has been found to be flawed, it would not be a proper exercise of the discretion to refuse to quash it. Both the nature of the flaw in the decision and the ground for exercise of the discretion have to be considered. In Berkeley, the flaw was the complete absence of an EIA and the sole ground for the exercise of the discretion was that the result was bound to have been the same.

However, if, as in United States Tobacco (see per Taylor LJ, as he then was, at 370–371, and at 376, per Morland J), and in Interbrew (see per Moses J at pp 33–35 of the transcript), a decision-maker, in the course of decision-making, becomes aware of some internal material or a factor of potential significance to the decision to be made, fairness may demand that the party or parties concerned should be given an opportunity to deal with it.