Physical Health in UK Law

Who were the "others to whom that reason does not or would not apply"? This had been considered in detail by Mummery LJ giving judgment in the Court of Appeal in Clark v Novacold [1999] ICR 95. In the context of Malcolm the first approach would require the comparison with an able bodied man who had sub-let, and the second with someone who had not sublet.

There are great dangers in a court grappling with issues such as those that Munby J has addressed when these are divorced from a factual context that requires their determination. The danger is that the court will enunciate propositions of principle without full appreciation of the implications that these will have in practice, throwing into confusion those who feel obliged to attempt to apply those principles in practice.

The right given to the person by section 2(1) of the Chronically Sick and Disabled Persons Act 1970 was a right to have the arrangements made which the local authority was satisfied were necessary to meet his needs. The duty only arises if or when the local authority is so satisfied. But when it does arise then it is clear that a shortage of resources will not excuse a failure in the performance of the duty.

Decisions both in our courts and in the ECtHR therefore combine to lead me to the confident conclusion that, as a severely disabled child in need of lengthy in-patient hospital treatment, Cameron had a status falling within the grounds of discrimination prohibited by article 14. Why should discrimination (if such it be) between disabled persons with different needs engage article 14 any less than discrimination between a disabled person and an able-bodied person?

Proceeding to the other paragraphs: "or (b) of any structure belonging to a local health authority, or to a voluntary organisation formed for any of the purposes mentioned in sub-section (1) of section twenty-eight of the National Health Service Act, 1946 (which relates to the prevention of illness, and to the care and after-care of persons suffering from illness or mental defectiveness), and supplied for the use of any person in pursuance of arrangements made under that sub-section; or (c) of any structure belonging to a local authority, within the meaning of section twenty-nine of the National Assistance Act, 1948 (which relates to welfare arrangements for blind, deaf, dumb and other handicapped persons), or to such a voluntary organisation as is mentioned in Section 30 of that Act, and supplied for the use of any person in pursuance of arrangements made under the said section twenty-nine; or, (d) of any structure which is of a kind similar to structures such as are referred to in paragraph (a), paragraph (b) or paragraph (c) of this sub-section, but does not fall within that paragraph by reason that it is owned or has been supplied otherwise than as mentioned in that paragraph".

I am not saying that there is in law any presumption that mentally incapacitated adults are better off with their families: often they will be; sometimes they will not be.

My conclusion is that the Commissioners have undoubted jurisdiction to determine any challenge to the vires of a provision in regulations made by the Secretary of State as being beyond the scope of the enabling power whenever it is necessary to do so in determining whether a decision under appeal was erroneous in point of law.