Right to Liberty and Security in UK Law

Leading Cases
  • P (by his litigation friend the Official Solicitor) v Cheshire West and Chester Council and another
    • Supreme Court
    • 19 Mar 2014

    The second question, therefore, is what is the essential character of a deprivation of liberty? It is common ground that three components can be derived from Storck, paras 74 and 89, confirmed in Stanev, paras 117 and 120, as follows: (a) the objective component of confinement in a particular restricted place for a not negligible length of time; (b) the subjective component of lack of valid consent; and (c) the attribution of responsibility to the state.

    If it would be a deprivation of my liberty to be obliged to live in a particular place, subject to constant monitoring and control, only allowed out with close supervision, and unable to move away without permission even if such an opportunity became available, then it must also be a deprivation of the liberty of a disabled person. The fact that my living arrangements are comfortable, and indeed make my life as enjoyable as it could possibly be, should make no difference.

  • R (Benson) v Secretary of State for Justice
    • Queen's Bench Division (Administrative Court)
    • 20 Ago 2007

    One can perhaps justify that by saying that it is simply the means whereby the sentence of the court is to be served. That may well be a way of justifying the distinction to be drawn between it and the situation where there has to be a release on licence and the licence cannot and does not contain such severe measures as are appropriate in release under section 246.

  • R v Deputy Governor of Parkhurst Prison and Others, ex parte Hague ; Weldon v Home Office
    • House of Lords
    • 24 Jul 1991

    The tort of false imprisonment has two ingredients: the fact of imprisonment and the absence of lawful authority to justify it. Thus if A imposes on B a restraint within defined bounds and is sued by B for false imprisonment, the action will succeed or fail according to whether or not A can justify the restraint imposed on B as lawful. A child may be lawfully restrained within defined bounds by his parents or by the schoolmaster to whom the parents have delegated their authority.

  • Re K (A Child) (Secure Accommodation Order: Right to Liberty)
    • Court of Appeal
    • 15 Nov 2000

    This analysis emphasises that plainly not all restrictions placed on the liberty of children constitute deprivation. Obviously parents have a right and a responsibility to restrict the liberty of their children, not only for protective and corrective purposes, but also sometimes for a punitive purpose. So acting they only risk breaching a child's Article 5(1) rights if they exceed reasonable bounds. Equally parents may delegate that right and responsibility to others.

  • R (Secretary of State for the Home Department) v Mental Health Review Tribunal
    • Court of Appeal
    • 19 Dic 2002

    There is little dispute about the principles established in the Strasbourg jurisprudence as applicable to the interpretation of Article 5(1). First, a basic distinction is to be drawn between mere restrictions on liberty of movement and the deprivation of liberty. The former are governed by Article 2 of Protocol no. 4 and do not amount to a breach of Article 5.

  • Rk (by her litigation friend the Official Solicitor) v (1) BCC (2) YB and Another
    • Court of Appeal
    • 20 Dic 2011

    However restrictions so imposed must not in their totality amount to deprivation of liberty. Deprivation of liberty engages the Article 5 rights of the child and a parent may not lawfully detain or authorise the deprivation of liberty of a child.

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