Road Traffic in UK Law

Leading Cases
  • R v Williams (Jason)
    • Court of Appeal (Criminal Division)
    • 02 Nov 2010

    In our view, applying this approach, it is therefore necessary for us to consider the meaning of cause as used in s.3ZB of the Road Traffic Act 1988 in the context of the intention of Parliament. First, the meaning of cause in death by dangerous driving was decided by Hennigan. That decision makes clear it is a cause if it is more than negligible or de minimis. We do not think that Parliament can have intended any different definition for s.3ZB.

  • R v London Boroughs Transport Committee, ex parte Freight Transport Association Ltd
    • House of Lords
    • 24 Jul 1991

    A vehicle which complies with all the weight, size, sound level and other technical requirements and standards of Directives issued by the council pursuant to article 100 and is therefore entitled to be used in every member state throughout the Community is not thereby entitled to be driven on every road, on every day, at every hour throughout the Community.

  • Clarke v Kato; Cutter v Eagle Star Insurance Company Ltd
    • House of Lords
    • 22 Oct 1998

    In Oxford v. Austin [1981] R.T.R. 416, 418 Kilner Brown J. referred to a road as One obvious feature of a road as commonly understood is that its physical limits are defined or at least definable. It should always be possible to ascertain the sides of a road or to have them ascertained. I do not find it helpful to use the language of a "through route" beyond recognising that a road should lead from one point to another.

    A more formidable argument for the appellants in my view lies in the fact that the legislation is in certain sections expressly made to apply not simply to "a road" but to "a road or other public place." These added words appeared in section 15(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1930 in relation to the offence of driving a motor vehicle when under the influence of drink or drugs.

  • Djanogly v Westminster City Council
    • Queen's Bench Division (Administrative Court)
    • 16 Jul 2010

    There is in section 45 no statutory purpose specifically identified for charging. Charging may be justified provided it is aimed at the fulfilment of the statutory purposes which are identified in section 122 (compendiously referred to by the parties as ‘traffic management purposes’). What the authority may not do is introduce charging and charging levels for the purpose, primary or secondary, of raising section 55(4) revenue.

  • Keyse v Commissioner of Police for Metropolis and Another
    • Court of Appeal (Civil Division)
    • 18 May 2001

    In my judgment, although drivers should allow for the unexpected when they are at the wheel of a car, it would inhibit the valuable work done for the community as a whole, if drivers in the emergency services were not allowed to drive their vehicles on the basis that pedestrians would recognise their warning lights and sirens and give them proper priority by keeping out of their paths.

  • Gorringe v Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council
    • House of Lords
    • 01 Abr 2004

    They are entitled to complain if damage is caused by some obstruction or condition of the road or its surroundings that constitutes a public nuisance. But an overriding imperative is that those who drive on public highways do so in a manner and at a speed that is safe having regard to such matters as the nature of the road, the weather conditions and the traffic conditions. Drivers are first and foremost themselves responsible for their own safety.

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