Tenancy in UK Law

The letting in each case was of a house comprising more dwellings than one. But I agree with the county court judge in thinking that Parliament when it enacted Section 1 (1) used the singular diliberately, and in this instance did not intend the singular to include the plural. The policy of the Rent Acts was and is to protect the tenant in his home, whether the threat be to extorta premium for the grant or renewal of his tenancy, to increase his rent, or to evict him.

This is an area where, in our judgment, the courts must treat the decisions of Parliament as to what is in the public interest with particular deference. The correctness of this decision is more appropriate for Parliament than the courts and the HRA does not require the courts to disregard the decisions of Parliament in relation to situations of this sort when deciding whether there has been a breach of the convention.

We are satisfied, that notwithstanding its mandatory terms, section 21(4) of the 1988 Act does not conflict with the defendant's right to family life. Section 21(4) is certainly necessary in a democratic society in so far as there must be a procedure for recovering possession of property at the end of a tenancy. The question is whether the restricted power of the court is legitimate and proportionate. This is the area of policy where the court should defer to the decision of Parliament.

In all the cases where an occupier has been held to be a licensee there has been something in the circumstances to negative any intention to create a tenancy, such as a family arrangement, an act of friendship or generosity, or such like. In such circumstances it would be obviously unjust to saddle the owner with a tenancy with all the momentous consequences that that entails nowadays when there was no intention to create a tenancy at all.

The situation in the present case is different, as it was a notice to quit served by one of the joint tenants that terminated the tenancy.

The premises were Mr Qazi's home, and evicting him would obviously amount to an interference with his enjoyment of the premises as his home. But his right to occupy them as such was circumscribed by the terms of his tenancy and had come to an end. Its obligation to "respect" Mr Qazi's home was not infringed by its requirement that he vacate the premises at the expiry of the period during which it had agreed that he might occupy them.