Terrorism in UK Law

What is striking about the language of s1, read as a whole, is its breadth. Finally, the legislation does not exempt, nor make an exception, nor create a defence for, nor exculpate what some would describe as terrorism in a just cause. Terrorism is terrorism, whatever the motives of the perpetrators.

KJ appears to be authority for the proposition that military action directed against the armed forces of the government does not as such constitute terrorism or acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. SIAC in SS stated that these observations were made per incuriam.

However, the LTTE, during the period when KJ was a member, was not such an organisation. It pursued its political ends in part by acts of terrorism and in part by military action directed against the armed forces of the government of Sri Lanka. The application of Article 1F(c) is less straightforward in such a case.

The natural meaning of that section requires that a document or record that infringes it must contain information of such a nature as to raise a reasonable suspicion that it is intended to be used to assist in the preparation or commission of an act of terrorism. Thus the section places on the person possessing it the obligation to provide a reasonable excuse.

This establishes that the controlee must be given sufficient information about the allegations against him to enable him to give effective instructions in relation to those allegations. Provided that this requirement is satisfied there can be a fair trial notwithstanding that the controlee is not provided with the detail or the sources of the evidence forming the basis of the allegations.

Eighthly, a renewed authorisation is subject to the same confirmation procedure. Ninthly, the powers conferred on a constable by an authorisation under sections 44( 1) or (2) may only be exercised to search for articles of a kind which could be used in connection with terrorism. Lastly, it is clear that any misuse of the power to authorise or confirm or search will expose the authorising officer, the Secretary of State or the constable, as the case may be, to corrective legal action.

A number of principles, however, can properly be emphasised. First, as with any criminal offence, s. 143 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 directs the sentence to consider culpability and harm: in most cases of terrorist offences, the former will be extremely high. Second, the purpose of sentence for the most serious terrorist offences is to punish, deter and incapacitate.