Tort of Deceit in UK Law

Secondly, he must demonstrate a misrepresentation by the defendant to the public (whether or not intentional) leading or likely to lead the public to believe that goods or services offered by him are the goods or services of the plaintiff.

130. However, the judge went on to say (in paragraph 202 of his judgment) that where the breach of the duty of disclosure is fraudulent, a party to whom the duty is owed who suffers loss by reason of the breach may recover damages for that loss in the tort of deceit. Once again, I respectfully agree with him. Non-disclosure where there is a duty to disclose is tantamount to an implied representation that there is nothing relevant to disclose.

The antecedent facts concerning the true situation in MCB are important, but it is what is done with those facts that really matters so far as the tort of fraudulent misrepresentation or deceit is concerned. In short, it is (on the assumptions I have made) MCB's decision not to tell the facts as they are and to continue to mislead that matters most, not the true facts themselves.

The "average consumer" is a notional individual whereas the substantial proportion test involves a statistical assessment, necessarily crude. Whichever approach one uses, one is essentially doing the same thing – forming an overall ("global") assessment as to whether there is likely to be significant consumer confusion. It is essentially a value judgment to be drawn from all the circumstances. Further conceptional overelaboration is apt to obscure this and is accordingly unhelpful.

It is possible to formulate a defence to the passing off action in two ways. First, it could be said that Inter Lotto has no enforceable goodwill and reputation. He asserted that Camelot's ownership of the '392 registered mark provided it with an entitlement to use it. He said that his client had a "better" claim than Inter Lotto to the marks in suit. He said that the issue was one of priority of rights and "hierarchy".

In my view there can be discerned from the cases a jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief where a defendant is equipped with or is intending to equip another with an instrument of fraud. Whether any name is an instrument of fraud will depend upon all the circumstances. A name which will, by reason of its similarity to the name of another, inherently lead to passing-off is such an instrument.

My Lords, Spalding v. Gamage and the later cases make it possible to identify five characteristics which must be present in order to create a valid cause of action for passing off: (1) a misrepresentation (2) made by a trader in the course of trade, (3) to prospective customers of his or ultimate consumers of goods or services supplied by him, (4) which is calculated to injure the business or goodwill of another trader (in the sense that this is a reasonably foreseeable consequence) and (5) which causes actual damage to a business or goodwill of the trader by whom the action is brought or (in a quia timet action) will probably do so.