Transport in UK Law

We think it is clearly implicit in the legislation that while it was left to the Defendants to decide what fares should be charged within any prescribed statutory maxima for the time being in force, the undertaking was to be run as a business venture, or, in other words, that fares fixed by the Defendants at their discretion, in accordance with ordinary business principles, were to be charged.

Democratically elected bodies go about their decision-making in a different way from courts. But the courts should not impose too demanding a standard upon such reports, for otherwise their whole purpose will be defeated: the councillors either will not read them or will not have a clear enough grasp of the issues to make a decision for themselves. It is their job, and not the court's, to weigh the competing public and private interests involved.

In the view that I have formed it is not necessary for me to deal with the question of negligence. I desire only to register my dissent from the view expressed by the Master of the Rolls that drivers A driver is not of course bound to anticipate folly in all its forms, but he is not in my opinion entitled to put out of consideration the teachings of experience as to the form those follies commonly take.

Towards the trespasser the occupier has no duty to take reasonable care for his protection or even to protect him from concealed danger. An occupier is in such a case liable only where the injury is due to some wilful act involving something more than the absence of reasonable care. There must be some act done with the deliberate intention of doing harm to the trespasser, or at least some act done with reckless disregard of the presence of the trespasser.

It seems to me that, if a person by his fault creates a situation of peril, he must answer for it to any person who attempts to rescue the person who is in danger. The rescuer may act instinctively out of humanity or deliberately out of courage. But whichever it is, so long as it is not wanton interference, if the rescuer is killed or injured in the attempt, he can recover damages from the one whose fault has been the cause of it.

Sullivan J held that the starting point was that it was for the local planning authority to decide whether the information supplied by the applicant was sufficient to meet the definition of an environmental statement in the EIA Regulations, subject to review on normal Wednesbury principles (see [32]–[33]).

An application under section 288 is not an opportunity for a review of the planning merits of an Inspector's decision. An allegation that an Inspector's conclusion on the planning merits is Wednesbury perverse is, in principle, within the scope of a challenge under section 288, but the court must be astute to ensure that such challenges are not used as a cloak for what is, in truth, a rerun of the arguments on the planning merits.