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Case: Issue. Case ID: 2022/0147
Issues:What does a claimant need to demonstrate to rely on s3(1) of the Defamation Act 1952 in a claim for malicious falsehood?Facts:The respondent, Ms Fiona George, worked as a recruitment consultant for an agency owned and operated by Ms Linda Cannell (the first appellant) called LCA Jobs Ltd (the second appellant). After the respondent moved to a different agency, the first appellant spoke to one of the respondent's clients and sent an email to her new employer alleging that she was acting in breach of restrictions in her contact with LCA Jobs Ltd which prevented her from contacting LCA Jobs Ltd's clients. The respondent sued the appellants for libel, slander and malicious falsehood. This appeal is concerned with the claim for malicious falsehood. The trial judge dismissed the claim for malicious falsehood as the respondent had not proved special damaged as required by the common law or demonstrated that her case fell within an exception to that requirement contained in s3(1) of the Defamation Act 1952. The Court of Appeal found in favour of the respondent. The appellants now appeal to the Supreme Court. This appeal is concerned with what the respondent needs to prove to take advantage of s3(1) of the Defamation Act 1952 and avoid the need to prove special damage to succeed in her claim for malicious falsehood.
Case: Issue. Case ID: 2022/0144
Issues:Whether the Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) was entitled to conclude that RM's mental disorder continues to be of a nature or degree warranting his continued detention in hospital for medical treatment (i.e. whether the test for discharge from a Restriction Order under Article 78 of the Mental Health (Northern Ireland) Order 1986 (the Order) is met).Facts:RM suffers from a severe mental impairment. On 2 March 2018, RM was charged for a series of violent and sexual offences. RM was found unfit to plead to the charges but was held to have committed the alleged acts. The Crown Court imposed a Hospital Order and a Restriction Order on RM. RM was detained in a psychiatric ward in Muckamore Abbey Hospital. On 16 January 2019, RM made an application for discharge to the Tribunal. The expert medical evidence before the Tribunal indicated that RM would shortly begin receiving treatment outside of Muckamore Abbey Hospital in a community-based setting known as Knockcairn (assisted and sheltered accommodation) as part of a period of testing. Under Article 78 of the Order, a patient may only continue to be detained if they are suffering from a mental disorder of a nature or degree which warrants their detention in hospital for medical treatment. The Tribunal acknowledged that RM's care plan would involve him moving to live in a community-based setting but considered that he would nonetheless remain a patient receiving treatment in hospital. RM brought an application for judicial review of the decision of the Tribunal arguing that his continued detention was unlawful in light of the treatment plan advanced in medical evidence which did not envisage further treatment in hospital. The High Court dismissed the appeal upholding the decision of the Tribunal. However, the Court of Appeal overturned the decisions of the Tribunal and High Court holding that they had erred in law. The Tribunal and Department of Justice now jointly appeal to the Supreme Court.
Case: Issue. Case ID: 2022/0145
Issues:Whether the Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) was entitled to conclude that RM's mental disorder continues to be of a nature or degree warranting his continued detention in hospital for medical treatment (i.e. whether the test for discharge from a Restriction Order under Article 78 of the Mental Health (Northern Ireland) Order 1986 (the Order) is met).Facts:RM suffers from a severe mental impairment. On 2 March 2018, RM was charged for a series of violent and sexual offences. RM was found unfit to plead to the charges but was held to have committed the alleged acts. The Crown Court imposed a Hospital Order and a Restriction Order on RM. RM was detained in a psychiatric ward in Muckamore Abbey Hospital. On 16 January 2019, RM made an application for discharge to the Tribunal. The expert medical evidence before the Tribunal indicated that RM would shortly begin receiving treatment outside of Muckamore Abbey Hospital in a community-based setting known as Knockcairn (assisted and sheltered accommodation) as part of a period of testing. Under Article 78 of the Order, a patient may only continue to be detained if they are suffering from a mental disorder of a nature or degree which warrants their detention in hospital for medical treatment. The Tribunal acknowledged that RM's care plan would involve him moving to live in a community-based setting but considered that he would nonetheless remain a patient receiving treatment in hospital. RM brought an application for judicial review of the decision of the Tribunal arguing that his continued detention was unlawful in light of the treatment plan advanced in medical evidence which did not envisage further treatment in hospital. The High Court dismissed the appeal upholding the decision of the Tribunal. However, the Court of Appeal overturned the decisions of the Tribunal and High Court holding that they had erred in law. The Tribunal and Department of Justice now jointly appeal to the Supreme Court.
Case: Issues. Case ID: 2022/0135
Issues:This case is about whether the Court of Appeal was correct to strike out a defamation claim as an abuse of process. The UKSC is asked to decide: Whether a foreign criminal conviction which a claimant did not have a full opportunity to contest was a relevant factor in showing that English proceedings which require determination of the same issues as those before the foreign criminal court are an abuse of process? Are prior press publications of defamatory allegations admissible evidence of bad reputation in this context if such publications have taken place some months prior to the publication complained of and are uncontradicted by a successful claim for libel? Can potential difficulties which the Respondent may have in proving the truth of the allegations which it had published about the conduct of the Appellant some 50 years ago be a relevant factor supporting a finding of abuse? Did the Court of Appeal err in finding that a combination of partial aspects of the Hunter and Jameel abuse jurisdictions, none of which necessarily amount to abuse on its own, can properly ground a finding of abuse of process? Facts:The Appellant was born in Bangladesh (known at the time as 'East Pakistan') and later naturalised as a British citizen. During violence in 1971, when Bangladesh achieved independence from Pakistan, 18 intellectuals were murdered in Dhaka. In 1996, allegations were made in a channel 4 documentary accusing the Appellant of being involved in those murders. Later, in 2013, the Appellant was convicted in absentia and sentenced to death by the International Crimes Tribunal in Bangladesh of crimes against humanity. The Appellant did not take any part in that trial. He has always denied the allegations made against him and maintained his innocence. In October 2019, the Commission for Countering Extremism Commission (a non-statutory body expert committee for the Home Office) published report entitled 'Challenging Hateful Extremism'. The Report contained a footnote which referred to the Appellant's conviction and suggested he had links with violence in 1971. The Appellant sued the Secretary of State for the Home Department for libel and infringement of Articles 5, 6 and 10 GDPR. At the preliminary hearing it was held that the Report contained defamatory allegations of fact and personal data. The High Court struck out the Appellant's claim as an abuse of process. The Court of Appeal upheld the decision. The Appellant now appeals to the UK Supreme Court.
Case: Issues. Case ID: 2023/0095
Issues:The Supreme Court is asked to decide the following legal questions: Did the Divisional Court apply the wrong test when determining whether removal to Rwanda would breach article 3? If the Divisional Court applied the right test, was the Court of Appeal entitled to interfere with its conclusion that Rwanda was a safe third country? If the Divisional Court applied the wrong test or there was another basis for interfering with its conclusion, was the Court of Appeal right to conclude that Rwanda was not a safe third country because asylum seekers would face a real risk of refoulement? Did the Home Secretary fail to discharge her procedural obligation under article 3 to undertake a thorough examination of Rwanda's asylum procedures to determine whether they adequately protect asylum seekers against the risk of refoulement? Were there substantial grounds for believing that asylum seekers sent to Rwanda will face a real risk of treatment contrary to article 3 in Rwanda itself, in addition to the risk of refoulement? Does the Asylum Procedures Directive continue to have effect as retained EU law? This is relevant because the Directive only permits asylum seekers to be removed to a safe third country if they have some connection to it. None of the claimants has any connection to Rwanda. Facts:These appeals arise out of claims brought by individual asylum seekers ("the claimants") who travelled to the UK in small boats (or, in one case, by lorry). The Home Secretary declared the claimants' claims for asylum to be inadmissible, intending that they should be removed to Rwanda where their asylum claims would be decided by the Rwandan authorities. Her decisions were made in accordance with the Migration and Economic Development Partnership ("MEDP") between the UK and Rwanda, recorded in a Memorandum of Understanding and a series of diplomatic "Notes Verbales". Under paragraphs 345A to 345D of the Immigration Rules, if the Home Secretary decides that an asylum claim is inadmissible, she is permitted to remove the person who has made the claim to any safe third country that agrees to accept the asylum claimant. On the basis of the arrangements made in the MEDP, the Home Secretary decided that Rwanda was a safe third country for these purposes. This is "the Rwanda policy". The claimants (and other affected asylum seekers) challenged both the lawfulness of the Rwanda policy generally, and the Home Secretary's decisions to remove each claimant to Rwanda. The Divisional Court held that the Rwanda policy was, in principle, lawful. However, the way in which the Home Secretary had implemented the policy in the claimants' individual cases was procedurally flawed. Accordingly, her decisions in those cases would be quashed and remitted to her for reconsideration. The appeal to the Court of Appeal concerned only the challenges to the lawfulness of the Rwanda policy generally. By a majority, the Court allowed the claimants' appeal on the ground that the deficiencies in the asylum system in Rwanda were such that there were substantial reasons for believing that there is a real risk of refoulement. That is, a real risk that persons sent to Rwanda would be returned to their home countries where they face persecution or other inhumane treatment, when, in fact, they have a good claim for asylum. In that sense Rwanda was not a safe third country. Accordingly, unless and until the deficiencies in its asylum processes are corrected, removal of asylum seekers to Rwanda will be unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998. This is because it would breach article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading treatment. The Court of Appeal unanimously rejected the claimants' other grounds of appeal. The Home Secretary now appeals to the Supreme Court on issues (1) to (3) below. AAA (Syria) and others and HTN (Vietnam) cross appeal on issues (4) and (5). AS (Iran) also cross appeals on issue (4). ASM (Iraq) appeals on issue (6).
Case: Issue. Case ID: 2022/0127
Issues:(1) Would a requested person be entitled to a retrial or (on appeal) to a review amounting to a retrial where the law of the requesting state confers a right to retrial which depends on a finding by a judicial authority, in the requesting state, as to whether the requested person was deliberately absent from his trial? (2) Would a requested person be entitled to a retrial or (on appeal) to a review amounting to a retrial where it is not possible for a judge to say that a finding of deliberate absence by a judicial authority, in the requesting state, is "theoretical" or "so remote that it can be discounted"?Facts:Ionut-Bogdan Merticariu is subject to a European Arrest Warrant ("EAW") issued by the Romanian Judicial Authority on 7 May 2019. Acting with others, Mr Merticariu entered commercial premises using a key which the group had as employees of the business concerned. Goods valued at around EUR 1,500 were taken but some of these were later returned. Mr Merticariu was convicted and sentenced for the burglary of commercial premises in his absence. Mr Merticariu was arrested under the EAW on 25 September 2019. Following a hearing at Westminster Magistrates' Court, Mr Merticariu's extradition was ordered. The High Court dismissed Mr Merticariu's appeal. Mr Merticariu now seeks permission to appeal to the UK Supreme Court. Mr Merticariu contests his extradition. One of the conditions for a court to make an extradition order under s.20(5) of The Extradition Act 2003 requires the court to be satisfied that the requested person would be entitled to a retrial or (on appeal) to a review amounting to a retrial. Mr Merticariu argues that this requirement has not been satisfied and that he should be discharged.
Case: Issues. Case ID: 2023/0097
Issues:The Supreme Court is asked to decide the following legal questions: Did the Divisional Court apply the wrong test when determining whether removal to Rwanda would breach article 3? If the Divisional Court applied the right test, was the Court of Appeal entitled to interfere with its conclusion that Rwanda was a safe third country? If the Divisional Court applied the wrong test or there was another basis for interfering with its conclusion, was the Court of Appeal right to conclude that Rwanda was not a safe third country because asylum seekers would face a real risk of refoulement? Did the Home Secretary fail to discharge her procedural obligation under article 3 to undertake a thorough examination of Rwanda's asylum procedures to determine whether they adequately protect asylum seekers against the risk of refoulement? Were there substantial grounds for believing that asylum seekers sent to Rwanda will face a real risk of treatment contrary to article 3 in Rwanda itself, in addition to the risk of refoulement? Does the Asylum Procedures Directive continue to have effect as retained EU law? This is relevant because the Directive only permits asylum seekers to be removed to a safe third country if they have some connection to it. None of the claimants has any connection to Rwanda. Facts:These appeals arise out of claims brought by individual asylum seekers ("the claimants") who travelled to the UK in small boats (or, in one case, by lorry). The Home Secretary declared the claimants' claims for asylum to be inadmissible, intending that they should be removed to Rwanda where their asylum claims would be decided by the Rwandan authorities. Her decisions were made in accordance with the Migration and Economic Development Partnership ("MEDP") between the UK and Rwanda, recorded in a Memorandum of Understanding and a series of diplomatic "Notes Verbales". Under paragraphs 345A to 345D of the Immigration Rules, if the Home Secretary decides that an asylum claim is inadmissible, she is permitted to remove the person who has made the claim to any safe third country that agrees to accept the asylum claimant. On the basis of the arrangements made in the MEDP, the Home Secretary decided that Rwanda was a safe third country for these purposes. This is "the Rwanda policy". The claimants (and other affected asylum seekers) challenged both the lawfulness of the Rwanda policy generally, and the Home Secretary's decisions to remove each claimant to Rwanda. The Divisional Court held that the Rwanda policy was, in principle, lawful. However, the way in which the Home Secretary had implemented the policy in the claimants' individual cases was procedurally flawed. Accordingly, her decisions in those cases would be quashed and remitted to her for reconsideration. The appeal to the Court of Appeal concerned only the challenges to the lawfulness of the Rwanda policy generally. By a majority, the Court allowed the claimants' appeal on the ground that the deficiencies in the asylum system in Rwanda were such that there were substantial reasons for believing that there is a real risk of refoulement. That is, a real risk that persons sent to Rwanda would be returned to their home countries where they face persecution or other inhumane treatment, when, in fact, they have a good claim for asylum. In that sense Rwanda was not a safe third country. Accordingly, unless and until the deficiencies in its asylum processes are corrected, removal of asylum seekers to Rwanda will be unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998. This is because it would breach article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading treatment. The Court of Appeal unanimously rejected the claimants' other grounds of appeal. The Home Secretary now appeals to the Supreme Court on issues (1) to (3) below. AAA (Syria) and others and HTN (Vietnam) cross appeal on issues (4) and (5). AS (Iran) also cross appeals on issue (4). ASM (Iraq) appeals on issue (6).
Case: Issue. Case ID: 2022/0113
Issues:When will a refusal by the Secretary of State for the Home Department to grant leave to remain to an individual, who cannot be removed to their country of nationality, violate that individual's right to respect for private and family life under article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights? Facts:AM is a Belarusian national. He arrived in the UK in 1998 and claimed asylum. His asylum claim was refused on 12 December 2000 and he was deported to Belarus on 29 June 2001. As AM told the Belarussian authorities that he was not a Belarussian citizen, he was refused entry and returned to the UK. Attempts by the Secretary of State to obtain necessary travel authorisations for AM from Belarussian authorities failed and he remains in the UK. Between 1999 and 2018, AM was also convicted of a number of offences and sentenced to several terms of imprisonment. On 15 September 2010, AM filed an application for judicial review of the Secretary of State's failure to provide him with leave to remain or permission to work in the UK. The High Court of England and Wales granted permission for this judicial review on 7 May 2011. In September 2011, the Secretary of State subsequently agreed to reconsider AM's asylum claim and the High Court stayed the judicial review claim. The Secretary of State again refused AM's asylum claim. AM appealed this refusal. On 30 March 2012, the First Tier Tribunal dismissed this appeal, finding that Belarus' refusal to admit him was because he had failed to provide accurate information, not his political opposition. AM appealed this judgment to the Upper Tribunal, which dismissed his appeal on 23 April 2013. Following the failure of further attempts by AM and the Secretary of State to obtain necessary travel authorisations for AM to travel to Belarus, AM applied to the Secretary of State for leave to remain in the UK as a stateless person on 9 February 2017. This too was refused. On 13 July 2018, AM applied to reinstate the judicial review proceedings which had previously been stayed. He also applied to add a second ground challenging the refusal to grant him leave to remain as a stateless person. On 31 July 2018, both applications were transferred to the Upper Tribunal, which granted permission to reinstate the judicial review proceedings and amend the grounds of challenge on 21 July 2020. Throughout this process, AM has suffered from ill-health. In early 2018, he was diagnosed with psychotic symptoms. The Upper Tribunal was also presented with evidence that he had attempted suicide whilst in detention and that his mental health had been adversely affected by delays in resolving his case and lack of status. The Upper Tribunal's judgment was handed down on 11 February 2021. It held that, as the likelihood of removing AM to Belarus was remote, continuing to refuse to grant AM leave to remain would be a violation of his right under article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. However, as the refusal of the Belarussian authorities to allow AM to enter Belarus was because of AM's persistent failure to tell the truth as to his identity, he was not stateless. The Secretary of State appealed the Upper Tribunal's finding regarding article 8 to the Court of Appeal of England and Wales, which dismissed its appeal. The Secretary of State now appeals that judgment to the UK Supreme Court.
Case: Issues. Case ID: 2023/0096
Issues:The Supreme Court is asked to decide the following legal questions: Did the Divisional Court apply the wrong test when determining whether removal to Rwanda would breach article 3? If the Divisional Court applied the right test, was the Court of Appeal entitled to interfere with its conclusion that Rwanda was a safe third country? If the Divisional Court applied the wrong test or there was another basis for interfering with its conclusion, was the Court of Appeal right to conclude that Rwanda was not a safe third country because asylum seekers would face a real risk of refoulement? Did the Home Secretary fail to discharge her procedural obligation under article 3 to undertake a thorough examination of Rwanda's asylum procedures to determine whether they adequately protect asylum seekers against the risk of refoulement? Were there substantial grounds for believing that asylum seekers sent to Rwanda will face a real risk of treatment contrary to article 3 in Rwanda itself, in addition to the risk of refoulement? Does the Asylum Procedures Directive continue to have effect as retained EU law? This is relevant because the Directive only permits asylum seekers to be removed to a safe third country if they have some connection to it. None of the claimants has any connection to Rwanda. Facts:These appeals arise out of claims brought by individual asylum seekers ("the claimants") who travelled to the UK in small boats (or, in one case, by lorry). The Home Secretary declared the claimants' claims for asylum to be inadmissible, intending that they should be removed to Rwanda where their asylum claims would be decided by the Rwandan authorities. Her decisions were made in accordance with the Migration and Economic Development Partnership ("MEDP") between the UK and Rwanda, recorded in a Memorandum of Understanding and a series of diplomatic "Notes Verbales". Under paragraphs 345A to 345D of the Immigration Rules, if the Home Secretary decides that an asylum claim is inadmissible, she is permitted to remove the person who has made the claim to any safe third country that agrees to accept the asylum claimant. On the basis of the arrangements made in the MEDP, the Home Secretary decided that Rwanda was a safe third country for these purposes. This is "the Rwanda policy". The claimants (and other affected asylum seekers) challenged both the lawfulness of the Rwanda policy generally, and the Home Secretary's decisions to remove each claimant to Rwanda. The Divisional Court held that the Rwanda policy was, in principle, lawful. However, the way in which the Home Secretary had implemented the policy in the claimants' individual cases was procedurally flawed. Accordingly, her decisions in those cases would be quashed and remitted to her for reconsideration. The appeal to the Court of Appeal concerned only the challenges to the lawfulness of the Rwanda policy generally. By a majority, the Court allowed the claimants' appeal on the ground that the deficiencies in the asylum system in Rwanda were such that there were substantial reasons for believing that there is a real risk of refoulement. That is, a real risk that persons sent to Rwanda would be returned to their home countries where they face persecution or other inhumane treatment, when, in fact, they have a good claim for asylum. In that sense Rwanda was not a safe third country. Accordingly, unless and until the deficiencies in its asylum processes are corrected, removal of asylum seekers to Rwanda will be unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998. This is because it would breach article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading treatment. The Court of Appeal unanimously rejected the claimants' other grounds of appeal. The Home Secretary now appeals to the Supreme Court on issues (1) to (3) below. AAA (Syria) and others and HTN (Vietnam) cross appeal on issues (4) and (5). AS (Iran) also cross appeals on issue (4). ASM (Iraq) appeals on issue (6).
Case: Issue. Case ID: 2022/0108
Issues:When does the sale or advertising of trade-marked goods on a foreign website infringe the relevant trade marks in the UK or EU?Facts:The Lifestyle entities are the owner and exclusive licencee of a number of UK and EU trade marks relating to the "BEVERLY HILLS POLO CLUB". The equivalent trade marks in the US are owned by another commercially unrelated entity, which produces goods identical to those for which Lifestyle's trade marks are registered in the UK/EU. Lifestyle claim that the Amazon entities have infringed their trade marks by advertising, offering for sale and ultimately selling the US manufactured goods to UK/EU customers on www.amazon.co.uk, www.amazon.de and www.amazon.com (as viewable in the UK/EU). Amazon admitted that the listings on www.amazon.co.uk and www.amazon.de were an infringement of Lifestyle's trade marks. However, they denied that the listing on www.amazon.com was an infringement as it was not targeted at UK/EU consumers and so not to be treated as use of the trade marks in the UK/EU. Amazon also denied that sale (through any of the websites) was an infringement of Lifestyle's trade marks in the UK/EU as the sales took place in the USA. The High Court dismissed Lifestyle's claims (except to the extent they were admitted by Amazon). The Court of Appeal overturned this decision and granted an injunction against Amazon. It did so on the basis that the High Court judge (i) was wrong in concluding that the listings on www.amazon.com were not targeted at UK/EU consumers; and (ii) misinterpreted EU case law which meant that the sales to customers in the UK/EU were themselves use of the trade marks in the UK/EU. Therefore, both the listing and the sales infringed Lifestyle's UK/EU trade marks. Amazon now seeks permission to appeal to the UK Supreme Court, on the basis that the Court of Appeal: (i) should not have overturned the High Court's analysis of whether the listings were targeted at UK/EU consumers; and (ii) misinterpreted the EU case law regarding whether sales on foreign websites could constitute infringement of the trade marks in the UK/EU.