Supreme Court

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Case: Issues. Case ID: 2023/0080
Issues:Did the Court of Appeal correctly interpret section 423 of the Insolvency Act 1986 by determining that: (1) a person can 'enter into' a transaction where they act on behalf of a company; and (2) there can be a 'transaction' for the purposes of section 423 where the asset which is alleged to have been disposed of at an undervalue was not beneficially owned by the 'debtor'?Facts:The Respondent, Invest Bank PSC ("the Bank"), is a public shareholding company established in the United Arab Emirates ("UAE"). The Bank claims that it is a creditor of Ahmad Mohammad El-Husseini ("Ahmad") pursuant to two alleged guarantees given by Ahmad in connection with credit facilities granted to two UAE companies. The Appellants, Alexander Ahmad El-Husseiny and Ziad Ahmad El-Husseiny, are two of Ahmad's sons. The Bank obtained judgments in Abu Dhabi against Ahmad amounting to roughly £20 million. The Bank issued proceedings in the Commercial Court seeking, amongst other things, relief under section 423 of the Insolvency Act 1986. Section 423 provides that in certain circumstances a court can provide relief where a person has entered into a transaction at an undervalue. The Bank alleged that Ahmad had transferred various assets at an undervalue, including transferring valuable London properties and shares to, amongst others, the Appellants. The Bank's case proceeded on the basis that Ahmad was not the beneficial owner of the transferred assets at the moment of transfer. The Bank alleged that the companies which beneficially owned and transferred the assets were ultimately owned and controlled by Ahmad. Ahmad and the Appellants applied to set aside service of the Bank's claim on them on the basis that, amongst other things, the section 423 claims did not raise a serious issue to be tried. The Commercial Court determined that the Bank had failed to plead a case raising a serious issue to be tried on the section 423 claims in respect of certain of the asset transfers. The Court also partially granted the Bank's application for permission to amend its Particulars of Claim. Both the Bank and the Appellants appealed against the Commercial Court's order. The Court of Appeal allowed the Bank's appeal and dismissed the Appellant's appeal. The Appellants now appeal to the Supreme Court.
Case: Issues. Case ID: 2023/0053
Issues:Was the Court of Appeal right, in balancing the respective article 8 and article 10 rights, to discharge the relevant Reporting Restriction Orders ("RROs")?Facts:Rashid and Aliya Abbasi, the respondents in the first appeal, are the parents of Zainab who was six years old when she died on 16 September 2019. Lanre Haastrup and Takesha Thomas, the respondents in the second appeal, are the parents of Isaiah who died on 7 March 2018. Zainab and Isaiah were in the care of the respective appellants. Indefinite RROs were made in both cases. RROs protect the identities of those involved in the care of a patient in respect of whom an application to withdraw treatment is made. In Zainab's case, they cannot name the small cohort of medical professionals protected by the RRO or give away information that would enable them to be identified (the "Abbasi RRO"). In Isaiah's case, the range of medical staff protected is wider (the "Haastrup RRO"). The parents appealed against the orders made by the President of the Family Division, which allowed the continuation of the RROs, on the basis that they now have the effect of preventing the parents meaningfully discussing or writing publicly about the circumstances in which their respective children were treated and died, or mainstream media from doing so if the parents were to spark interest in the circumstances of the cases. The continuation of the RROs involved a balancing exercise between the competing article 8 rights (which concern the right to privacy) of the hospital staff and the article 10 rights (which concern the right to freedom of expression) of the parents. The Court of Appeal discharged the RROs, with that order stayed pending an appeal to the Supreme Court. The appellants now appeal to the Supreme Court.
Case: Issues. Case ID: 2023/0052
Issues:Was the Court of Appeal right, in balancing the respective article 8 and article 10 rights, to discharge the relevant Reporting Restriction Orders ("RROs")?Facts:Rashid and Aliya Abbasi, the respondents in the first appeal, are the parents of Zainab who was six years old when she died on 16 September 2019. Lanre Haastrup and Takesha Thomas, the respondents in the second appeal, are the parents of Isaiah who died on 7 March 2018. Zainab and Isaiah were in the care of the respective appellants. Indefinite RROs were made in both cases. RROs protect the identities of those involved in the care of a patient in respect of whom an application to withdraw treatment is made. In Zainab's case, they cannot name the small cohort of medical professionals protected by the RRO or give away information that would enable them to be identified (the "Abbasi RRO"). In Isaiah's case, the range of medical staff protected is wider (the "Haastrup RRO"). The parents appealed against the orders made by the President of the Family Division, which allowed the continuation of the RROs, on the basis that they now have the effect of preventing the parents meaningfully discussing or writing publicly about the circumstances in which their respective children were treated and died, or mainstream media from doing so if the parents were to spark interest in the circumstances of the cases. The continuation of the RROs involved a balancing exercise between the competing article 8 rights (which concern the right to privacy) of the hospital staff and the article 10 rights (which concern the right to freedom of expression) of the parents. The Court of Appeal discharged the RROs, with that order stayed pending an appeal to the Supreme Court. The appellants now appeal to the Supreme Court.
Case: Issues. Case ID: 2022/0180
Issues:Did the Court of Appeal err in: holding that rectification is not available for a collective agreement which is not intended to be a legally enforceable contract; refusing to allow the claim to be amended; holding that an employment tribunal has power to reject a complaint on the grounds of rectification; holding that it would be an abuse of process to raise rectification in respect of past complaints and/or that a claim for rectification was estopped; and its holding on privity of interest. Facts:Tyne and Wear Passenger Transport Executive, the Appellant, trades as Nexus. It operates the Tyne and Wear Metro (the "Metro"). The Respondents are National Union Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers (the "RMT") and Unite the Union ("Unite") (together the "Unions"). These proceedings are a sequel to an earlier claim brought against Nexus by a group of employees (the "Anderson proceedings"). The background to the Anderson proceedings was that a collective agreement had been reached between the Unions and Nexus. In the letter of agreement (the "Letter Agreement") Nexus agreed to consolidate a pre-existing entitlement referred to (inaccurately) as a "productivity bonus" into the basic pay of the employees. In the Anderson proceedings the employees successfully argued that on the proper construction of the Letter Agreement their shift allowances were supposed to be calculated as a percentage uplift of their basic salary including the productivity bonus (the "enhanced basis"). As Nexus had been calculating shift allowances on an unenhanced basis, the employees' shift allowances had been underpaid. As a result of the Anderson proceedings, Nexus brought a claim to rectify the Letter Agreement for common mistake or alternatively unilateral mistake. A trial was held to determine preliminary matters. The Unions argued Nexus is estopped from pursuing its rectification claim since Nexus did not advance the mistake case in the Anderson proceedings. In support of the Unions' application for strike out or alternatively summary judgment, the Unions argued that the rectification claim was an abuse of process, barred by delay, and that the court had no power to rectify the Letter Agreement as it was a collective agreement which was not legally binding or enforceable. The High Court rejected the Unions' arguments and dismissed the strike-out and summary judgment applications. On appeal, the Court of Appeal ruled in favour of the Unions. Nexus now seeks permission to appeal to the Supreme Court.
Case: Issues. Case ID: 2022/0133
Issues:Was the CA wrong to find that Tesco was entitled to terminate certain employment contracts which included an entitlement to "Retained Pay", described as "permanent", and offer re-engagement on terms without Retained Pay (the so-called "fire and re-hire" mechanism)?Facts:In 2007, Tesco Stores Limited ("Tesco") planned to open new distribution centres and close others. To retain staff, it offered a significant enhancement to the pay of staff willing to relocate from its Lichfield centre to its Daventry centre. This pay is referred to as "Retained Pay". By incorporation of a collective agreement, the Retained Pay was described as "permanent" and, by the terms of the agreements, was stated as only changeable by mutual consent. In January 2021, Tesco wished to bring Retained Pay to an end. It therefore gave notice to the relevant staff that it intended to seek their agreement to remove Retained Pay from their contracts in exchange for a payment. If an employee did not agree to this change, their employment contract would be terminated and they would be offered re-engagement on different terms ("fire and rehire"). The individual appellants are employees who have refused to give up their Retained Pay. They brought a claim in the High Court, seeking a declaration that their employment contracts granted an entitlement to Retained Pay, that they were subject to an implied term that Tesco could not terminate the contracts for the purposes of removing Retained Pay and an injunction preventing Tesco from terminating the contracts. The appellants were successful in the High Court, but the appeal was allowed in the Court of Appeal. The appellants now appeal to the Supreme Court.
Case: Issues. Case ID: 2022/0124
Issues:Was the majority of the Court of Appeal wrong to find that the collateral warranty in this case was a "construction contract" for the purposes of section 104(1) of the Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 1996?Facts:Simply was engaged to carry out the construction of a care home under a building contract. In 2017, a long lease of the care home was granted to Abbey. In 2018, fire-safety defects were discovered in the care home. Another contractor rectified the defects. In 2020, the freeholder of the care home requested that Simply execute a collateral warranty in favour of Abbey. After initially refusing, Simply executed a collateral warranty, under which Simply warranted that it "has performed and will continue to perform diligently its obligations under the contract". The freeholder and Abbey both began adjudication proceedings in respect of the defects, and both were awarded sums against Simply by the adjudicator. The freeholder and Abbey both applied to the court for summary judgment to enforce the adjudicator's awards. As regards Abbey's application, Simply maintained that the collateral warranty delivered to Abbey was not a construction contract under s. 104(1) of the Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 1996 and that, accordingly, the adjudicator had had no jurisdiction. The Judge agreed and dismissed Abbey's summary judgment application. Abbey successfully appealed to the Court of Appeal and was granted summary judgment. Simply now appeals to the Supreme Court.
Case: Issues. Case ID: 2024/0015
Issues:Are the courts of England and Wales the proper place for UniCredit to bring its claim for an anti-suit injunction against RusChemAlliance, or should the claim have been brought in France? Are the arbitration agreements between the parties governed by French law or English law?Facts:RusChemAlliance ("RCA") is a company incorporated in Russia. UniCredit is a German bank with assets in Russia. RCA entered into contracts with a third party for the construction of gas processing plants in Russia. Under the contracts, RCA was obliged to pay the contractor approximately EUR 10 billion. The contractor was entitled to advance payments of EUR 2 billion, which RCA made. UniCredit issued seven on-demand bonds in favour of RCA to a total value of approximately EUR 420 million, four of which were to guarantee the performance of the contract and three of which were to secure repayment of the advance payments. The bonds each included a clause stating that: "This Bond and all non-contractual or other obligations arising out of or in connection with it shall be construed under and governed by English law". They also included a clause stating that disputes are to be resolved by an International Chamber of Commerce arbitration seated in Paris. The contractor subsequently wrote to RCA to say that it could not continue to perform the contracts because of EU sanctions imposed after Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The contractor also said it could not return the advance payments. (RCA itself is not designated under or otherwise subject to EU or UK sanctions.) RCA brought proceedings against UniCredit in the Russian courts seeking recovery of EUR 448 million under the bonds. UniCredit then issued a claim in this jurisdiction. UniCredit alleges that the proceedings commenced by RCA in Russia were in breach of the arbitration agreements in the bonds and seeks among other things an anti-suit injunction requiring RCA to discontinue the Russian proceedings. The High Court initially granted UniCredit an interim injunction on ex parte basis. However following trial, the High Court declared it had no jurisdiction to hear the claim on the grounds that the arbitration agreements were governed by French law, and that in any event England was not the proper place for the claim. The Court of Appeal allowed UniCredit's appeal and granted an injunction requiring RCA to discontinue the Russian proceedings. RCA now appeals to the Supreme Court.
Case: Issues. Case ID: UKSC 2023/0047
Issues:Does a failure to serve a claim notice on an intermediate landlord with no management responsibilities invalidate a right to manage claim under the Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002?Facts:This appeal concerns Tudor Studios, a former factory in Leicester now converted into student accommodation. The building mainly comprises "study studios", with some communal areas. The study studios are held by investor tenants on 250-year leases in tripartite form between the freeholder, the investor tenant and the management company. The appellant, A1 Properties (Sunderland) Limited, holds the common room, the laundry, the gym and the reception area on four 999-year leases. The Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 ("the 2002 Act") enabled tenants who hold long leases of flats in a self-contained building to acquire the right to manage that building. The investor tenants sought to exercise this right though the respondent, Tudor Studios RTM Company Limited. The respondent gave the claim notice required by section 79 of the 2002 Act to the freeholder and to the management company, but not to the appellant. The management company therefore served a counter-notice stating that the respondent was not entitled to acquire the right to manage Tudor Studios because it had not complied with the procedure set out in the 2002 Act. The respondent applied to the First-tier Tribunal for determination of the issue. The First-tier Tribunal held that the failure to serve notice on the appellant did not invalidate the respondent's right to manage claim because the appellant has no management responsibilities. The Upper Tribunal dismissed the appellant's appeal. The appellant now appeals to the Supreme Court.
Case: Issues. Case ID: UKSC 2023/0028
Issues: Were the lower courts correct to decide that loss suffered by the Respondent, in the form of diminution in value of the Respondent's property as a result of the encroachment of Japanese knotweed from the Appellant's land, was caused by the Appellant's breach of duty in failing to treat the knotweed, in circumstances where the encroachment first arose before the Appellant's breach?Facts:Japanese knotweed grew on the Appellant's land. It encroached onto adjacent property at 10 Dinam Street in Nant-y-moel, Bridgend. In 2004, the Respondent bought the property. In 2012, a Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors report on knotweed was published, describing difficulties it can cause. The Appellant had actual notice of the presence of knotweed on its land, in relative proximity to the adjacent property, in 2014. It did not take steps to treat it until 2018. The Respondent first became aware that knotweed could pose a problem for any sale of their property in 2017. He sued the Appellant for damages in nuisance. The District Judge found that: (i) it was very probable encroachment had occurred in 2004, if not before; (ii) the Appellant had constructive knowledge of Japanese knotweed based on information available at the time in 2012/13; and (iii) the Appellant was in breach of its duty to the Respondent, thereby committing a private nuisance, from 2013 until 2018. The Respondent's claim failed before the District Judge and Circuit Judge but succeeded on appeal to the Court of Appeal. The Appellant now appeals to the Supreme Court.
Case: Issues. Case ID: UKSC 2023/0029
Issues:"Where goods sold Cost & Freight free out are located at their discharge port, on the date of the buyer's default, in the circumstances as found by the GAFTA Appeal Board in the Awards, is "the actual or estimated value of the goods, on the date of default" under sub-clause (c) of the GAFTA Default Clause to be assessed by reference to: a) The market value of goods at that discharge port (where they are located on the date of default); or b) The theoretical cost on the date of default of (i) buying those goods Free on Board at the original port of shipment plus (ii) the market freight rate for transporting the goods from that port to the discharge port free out?"Facts:This is an appeal arising from two amended arbitration awards of the same five-member Grain and Free Trade Association ("GAFTA") Appeal Board dated 1 April 2021 (awards No. 4580A and 4581A - collectively, "the Awards"), by which it awarded damages to the sellers of two cargoes, one of lentils and one of peas, for the buyers' default following delivery to Mundra, a privately owned port in Gujarat state in the north west of India. Jacobs J granted the buyers leave to appeal pursuant to section 69 of the Arbitration Act 1996 on the above question of law arising from the Awards. The appeal was dismissed by Cockerill J, and allowed by the Court of Appeal.