Journal of Theoretical Politics

Name: Journal of Theoretical Politics
Creator: vLex
License: https://vlex.com/terms-of-service/

Publisher:: Sage Publications, Inc.
Publication date:: 2021-09-06

ISBN:: 0951-6298

Issue Number

No. 37-1, January 2025

Latest documents

On status quo bias and the existence of Condorcet cycles in binary voting situations
In most real-life binary voting situations, multiple challenger alternatives can potentially contest the status quo alternative, but only one of them can be listed on the ballot. Consequently, Condorcet cycles cannot be detected by analyzing voting data alone, even when they exist. This paper considers a standard theoretical framework where Condorcet cycles cannot exist, but demonstrates that this need not be the case when voters experience status quo bias. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of Condorcet cycles are provided. Monte Carlo simulations predict the probability that Condorcet cycles exist in binary voting situations with status quo bias to roughly one percent under different assumptions and scenarios.
Beyond a universal principle of justice: Normative implications of preference measurement assumptions
The main conclusions of two classical theories of justice can be represented as solutions to a decision making problem. Rawls’ second principle of justice is a result of applying the maximin criterion for decision-making behind the ‘veil of ignorance’. The utilitarian principle of maximizing average utility, meanwhile, can be traced back to applying the Laplace criterion of decision making behind the veil of ignorance. This article makes explicit the different assumptions about preference measurement and assumptions about interpersonal comparisons of utility that need to be made to use either of these principles. Once these assumptions are made explicit, it becomes clear that the choice between theories of justice cannot be exclusively settled by an exchange of arguments for one kind of distributional arrangement over the other, but is also a question of what kind of measurement assumptions are more plausible in a given context.
Simultaneous elections
This article analyzes the possible electoral advantages and disadvantages of a unique party that competes in two simultaneous elections with respect to those obtained when it competes as two different parties. I assume that a unified party has a larger strategy set but it is forced to choose the same policy in both elections. I analyze different scenarios depending on the features of the electorates and of the party configuration that it faces: the same party or two different parties. In all cases, I show that a unified party can only fare better than two independent parties when the two electorates are similar enough. In this case, the party may obtain the vote of the moderates in both elections. If the electorates are aligned with the opponent the gains from unification are more likely in more polarized electorates. Otherwise, the losses from unification increase with the intensity of the electoral competition.
Explanation, formal models, and rational choice
Formal theorists use a unified collection of models to generate intentional and causal explanations of political behavior. I explicate this claim and argue that disagreements about the role of unification and intentionality are at the root of persistent friction between theorists and empiricists. A debate around pathologies of rational choice theory is used to illustrate the argument.
Informative campaigns, overpromising, and policy bargaining
What is the relationship between policy positions taken in campaigns and those proposed in bargaining when the final policy outcome depends on other political actors? Why do candidates sometimes advocate policies in their campaigns that are unlikely or impossible to pass given the preferences of other actors in the government? We analyze a model in which candidates make non-binding policy platform announcements and then bargain with a Veto player over the final policy if they take office. In the model, a candidate has private information that is related to the policy preferences of a key citizen group and engages in bargaining with a Veto player who is responsive to this information. When the citizen’s group sometimes interprets campaign promises naively, elections are more likely to allow information revelation. Furthermore, in this case, politicians overpromise: the politician’s platform is outside of the range of feasible bargaining outcomes.
Quantifying theory in politics: Identification, interpretation, and the role of structural methods
The best empirical research in political science clearly defines substantive parameters of interest, presents a set of assumptions that guarantees their identification, and uses an appropriate estimator. We argue for the importance of explicitly integrating rigorous theory into this process and focus on the advantages of doing so. By integrating a theoretical structure into one’s empirical strategy, researchers can quantify the effects of competing mechanisms, consider the ex-ante effects of new policies, extrapolate findings to new environments, estimate model-specific theoretical parameters, evaluate the fit of a theoretical model, and test competing models that aim to explain the same phenomena. As a guide to such a methodology, we provide an overview of structural estimation, including formal definitions, implementation suggestions, examples, and comparisons to other methods.
Formal models in normative political theory
This article revisits the conventional distinction in political science between ‘positive’ and ‘normative’ political theory, particularly the belief that formal and mathematical methods are only pertinent to positive political theory. We argue that formal models are equally valuable in normative political theory for three reasons: they can make thought experiments more rigorous, they can demonstrate the consistency of normative principles, and they can provide insights into the practical workings of novel institutional arrangements in the absence of empirical data. The integration of formal models into normative political theory presents challenges, including the development of criteria for evaluating these models and potential shifts in research focus. Integration can also strengthen political theory’s tenuous role in the political science discipline.
A visa for a revolution? A theory of anti-authoritarian immigration policy
Sometimes, countries target immigration policies to citizens of authoritarian regimes with the goal of influencing these regimes’ politics. Which kinds of immigration rules are optimal anti-authoritarian policies and which trade-offs do policy-makers face? We analyze a game-theoretic model in which a destination country, an autocrat, and a citizen interact. The citizen can engage in protest and emigrate while the autocrat can redistribute and repress to counter these threats. A revolution occurs if the autocrat does not repress and the citizen protests. Policy-makers in destination countries anticipate that in equilibrium, a more permissive immigration policy reduces repression but also reduces protesting. Therefore, the optimal policy strikes a balance between these two effects. A concern for improving the citizen’s welfare renders policy more permissible while the desire to punish the autocrat has an ambiguous effect. Finally, we show that a revolution and large-scale emigration are difficult to achieve at the same time.
Multidimensional policies, asymmetric public perception and stability in autocracies
This paper provides a new explanation for autocracies’ political stability by focusing on the role of changes in asymmetric public perceptions of different policy dimensions. We show that the probability of policies enabling the provision of public goods on one dimension alone increases with the opacity of public perception. In turn, this implies that the probability of coups and revolts has a non-monotonic behavior in asymmetric opacity. Thus, transitional periods with changes in public perception might lead to an increase in the probability of coup and revolt attempts, reducing autocratic stability, and thereby altering some established ideas in the literature.
A comment on Powell and formal models of power sharing *
Ruling elites commonly concede institutional reforms such as expanding the franchise. In existing models, sharing power in this manner enables ruling elites to credibly commit to perpetual redistribution. In ‘Power Sharing with Weak Institutions,’ Powell (2024) explains why the commitment problem runs deeper: When institutions are weak, elites are likely to block the implementation of promised institutional concessions. I provide new insights into three foundational premises of Powell (2024) and related models. First, I identify a necessary condition for a common result: Ruling elites always minimize permanent power-sharing concessions vis-à-vis temporary concessions, subject to preventing revolt. However, unless reforming institutions is somehow costly, these two tools are perfect substitutes. Second, I discuss how to conceptualize institutional strength within this class of models. Third, in weak institutional environments, I suggest how scholars can model credible commitments to share power or democratize.