No. 94-3, September 2016
Index
- 'SUPRANATIONALISM' IN QUESTION: BELIEFS, VALUES, AND THE SOCIALIZING POWER OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION REVISITED
- AGENCIFICATION AND BLAME SHIFTING: EVALUATING A NEGLECTED SIDE OF PUBLIC SECTOR REFORMS
- DEFYING THE COMMISSION: CREATIVE COMPLIANCE AND RESPECT FOR THE RULE OF LAW IN THE EU
- DOES A PUBLIC SERVICE ETHIC ENCOURAGE ETHICAL BEHAVIOUR? PUBLIC SERVICE MOTIVATION, ETHICAL LEADERSHIP AND THE WILLINGNESS TO REPORT ETHICAL PROBLEMS
- EXIT AND VOICE IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT RECONSIDERED: A ‘CHOICE REVOLUTION’?
- GOVERNING BORDERLESS THREATS: NON‐TRADITIONAL SECURITY AND THE POLITICS OF STATE TRANSFORMATION
- GOVERNING ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICTS IN CHINA: UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS DO LOCAL GOVERNMENTS COMPROMISE?
- GOVERNING THE EMBEDDED STATE: THE ORGANIZATIONAL DIMENSION OF GOVERNANCE
- GOVERNMENT BY INVESTIGATION: CONGRESS, PRESIDENTS, AND THE SEARCH FOR ANSWERS, 1945–2012
- HYBRIDS AND PROFESSIONAL COMMUNITIES: COMPARING UK REFORMS IN HEALTHCARE, BROADCASTING AND POSTAL SERVICES
- INTERROGATING INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: ACTORS' ATTITUDES TO COMPETITION AND COOPERATION IN COMMISSIONING HEALTH SERVICES IN ENGLAND
- MANAGING SOCIAL CAPITAL AND DIVERSITY FOR PERFORMANCE IN PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS
- OPEN GOVERNMENT AND THE POLITICS OF PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE IN THE UNITED STATES
- PRAGMATIC MUNICIPALISM: LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICE DELIVERY AFTER THE GREAT RECESSION
- REVENUE SCARCITY AND GOVERNMENT OUTSOURCING: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM NORWEGIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
- RE‐EXAMINING THE NORMATIVE FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS: PUBLIC SERVICE, CITIZENSHIP, AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE
- TABLE OF CONTENTS
- THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL POLICY TRANSFER WITHIN THE MULTIPLE STREAMS APPROACH: THE CASE OF SMART ELECTRICITY METERING IN AUSTRALIA
- TOP‐DOWN AND BOTTOM‐UP: INSTITUTIONAL EFFECTS ON DEBT AND GRANTS AT THE ENGLISH AND GERMAN LOCAL LEVEL
- TRANSNATIONALIZATION AND REGULATORY CHANGE IN THE EU'S EASTERN NEIGHBOURHOOD: UKRAINE BETWEEN BRUSSELS AND MOSCOW
- VIOLENCE AND THE COSTS OF HONESTY: RETHINKING BUREAUCRATS' CHOICES TO TAKE BRIBES
- WHY STRONG COORDINATION AT ONE LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH STRONG COORDINATION ACROSS LEVELS (AND HOW TO LIVE WITH IT): THE CASE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION