Circumstantial Evidence in UK Law

It is, however, the essence of a successful case of circumstantial evidence that the whole is stronger than individual parts. That is why a jury is often directed to avoid piecemeal consideration of a circumstantial case: R v. Hillier (2007) 233 ALR 63 (HCA), cited in Archbold 2012 at para 10–3. Or, as Lord Simon of Glaisdale put it in R v. Kilbourne [1973] AC 729 at 758, The matter is well put in Shepherd v. The Queen (1990) 170 CLR 573 (HCA) at 579/580 (but also passim):

But their Lordships are of the opinion that a good character direction would have made no difference to the result in this case. In these circumstances the issues about the appellant's propensity to violent conduct and his credibility, as to which a good character reference might have been of assistance, are wholly outweighed by the nature and coherence of the circumstantial evidence.

The correct approach is to ask whether a reasonable jury, properly directed, would be entitled to draw an adverse inference. To draw an adverse inference from a combination of factual circumstances necessarily does involve the rejection of all realistic possibilities consistent with innocence. The correct test is the conventional test of what a reasonable jury would be entitled to conclude.

As in any criminal trial circumstantial evidence can be relied on to establish guilt. I accept the submission of Mr. Matthews QC, counsel for Mr. Ablyazov, that where a contempt application is brought on the basis of almost entirely secondary evidence the court should be particularly careful to ensure that any conclusion that a respondent is guilty is based upon cogent and reliable evidence from which a single inference of guilt, and only that inference, can be drawn.

It is well established that the omission of a good character direction is not necessarily fatal to the fairness of the trial or to the safety of a conviction— Jagdeo Singh's case [2006] 1 WLR 146 para 25 and Bhola v The State [2006] UKPC 9, paras 14–17.

It requires no more than ordinary commonsense for a jury to understand that if one suggested inference from an accepted piece of evidence leads to a conclusion of guilt and another suggested inference to a conclusion of innocence a jury could not on that piece of evidence alone be satisfied of guilt beyond all reasonable doubt unless they wholly rejected and excluded the latter suggestion.

As to the primary ground of appeal, the traditional approach identified by Lord Lane CJ in R v. Galbraith [1981] 1 WLR 1039 (if a reasonable jury properly directed could not on the evidence find the charge proved beyond reasonable doubt) concerned the weight to be attached to evidence implicating the defendant upon which the Crown relied.