Compulsory Purchase in UK Law

But this argument is in reality a play on the meaning of the word nullity. An Order, even if not made in good faith, is still an act capable of legal consequences. Unless the necessary proceedings are taken at law to establish the cause of invalidity and to get it quashed or otherwise upset it will remain as effective for its ostensible purpose as the most impeccable of Orders.

(3) Although no question of common intention arises, one must construe the compulsory purchase order and ascertain the intention of the acquiring authority. Camden must have intended to acquire the rights here in question, without which it would be impossible for the maisonettes to be used as houses.

I have some doubts whether in this respect the Court of Appeal properly applied the principle that it is appropriate to pierce the corporate veil only where special circumstances exist indicating that is a mere facade concealing the true facts. Woolfson cannot be treated as beneficially entitled to the whole share-holding in Campbell, since it is not found that the one share in Campbell held by his wife is held as his nominee.

The sole purpose of the certification procedure is to provide a basis for determining the development value, if any, to be taken into account in assessing the compensation payable on compulsory acquisition.

Parliament cannot have intended that the acquiring authority should pay as compensation a larger amount than the owner could reasonably have obtained for his land in the absence of the power. For the same reason there should also be disregarded the 'special want' of an acquiring authority for a particular site which arises from the authority having been authorised to acquire it.

Drawing a distinction between value to the owner and value to the purchaser makes it necessary to distinguish the one from the other. What is relevant, because this may affect the value of the land, is the use the acquiring authority proposes to make of the land it is acquiring. Accordingly, in identifying any enhanced value which must be disregarded it is always necessary to look beyond the mere existence of the power of compulsory purchase.

But in this case I am unable, consonant with the essential principles of fairness in a dispute, to uphold this compulsory purchase order. All cases in which principles of natural justice are invoked must depend on the particular circumstances of the cases. I can only say that in my opinion, in the circumstances I have outline, Fairmount has not had—in a phrase whose derivation neither I nor your Lordships could trace—a fair crack of the whip.