Conclusive Evidence in UK Law

On an appeal (which is a re-hearing) we have said that the fresh evidence must be such that, if given, it would probably have an important influence on the result of the case, though it need not be decisive, see Ladd v. Marshall (1954) 1 Weekly Law Reports at page 1491 and Skone v. Skone (1971) 1 Weekly Law Reports at page 815. But in order to avoid the effect of an estoppel (when there is no re-hearing) the fresh evidence must, I think, be decisive.

The entry on the definitive map does not necessarily remain conclusive evidence for ever. Section 33 makes provision for quinquennial revisions—though these do not appear in practice to have been carried out punctually. On a revision, entries on the definitive map which require modification as a result of events that have occurred since the date of the last revision may be modified accordingly.

Unless Lowe v Lombank is authority to the contrary, there is no legal principle that states that parties cannot agree to assume that a certain state of affairs is the case at the time the contract is concluded or has been so in the past, even if that is not the case, so that the contract is made upon the basis that the present or past facts are as stated and agreed by the parties.

But where the evidence is conflicting and the issue is one of fact depending on oral evidence, any Judge who has had experience of trying cases with witnesses cannot fail to realise the truth of what Lord Sumner says: as the evidence proceeds through examination, cross-examination and re-examination the Judge is gradually imbibing almost instinctively, but in fact as a result of close attention and of long experience, an impression of the personality of the witness and of his trustworthiness and of the accuracy of his observation and memory or the reverse.

The difficulty of course is that, where the later contract is intended to supersede the prior contract, it may in the generality of cases simply be useless to try to construe the later contract by reference to the earlier one. Therefore a cautious and sceptical approach to finding any assistance in the earlier contract seems to me to be a sound principle.

But the question whether a person is a "child" is a different kind of question. There is a right or a wrong answer. It may be difficult to determine what that answer is. The decision-makers may have to do their best on the basis of less than perfect or conclusive evidence. But that is true of many questions of fact which regularly come before the courts. That does not prevent them from being questions for the courts rather than for other kinds of decision makers.

But in all other respects, where a party comes to the court in the search of an ordinary remedy under the contract or for a remedy in respect of an alleged breach of it, the court is entitled to examine the facts and to form its own opinion upon them in the light of the evidence. The fact that the architect has formed an opinion on the matter will be part of the evidence. But, as it will not be conclusive evidence, the court can disregard his opinion if it does not agree with it.