Contempt of Court in UK Law

One particular form of contempt by a party to proceedings is that constituted by an intentional act which is in breach of the order of a competent court. Where this occurs as a result of the act of a party who is bound by the order or of others acting at his direction or on his instigation, it constitutes a civil contempt by him which is punishable by the court at the instance of the party for whose benefit the order was made and can be waived by him.

The sole purpose of proceedings for contempt is to give our Courts the power effectively to protect the rights of the public by ensuring that the administration of justice shall not be obstructed or prevented (Skipworth's case and The King v. Davies.) This power to commit for what is inappropriately called "contempt of Court" is sui generis and has from time immemorial reposed in the Judge for the protection of the public.

It is true that his conduct may very often be seen as possessing a dual character of contempt of court by himself and aiding and abetting the contempt by another, but the conduct will always amount to contempt of court by himself. It will be conduct which knowingly interferes with the administration of justice by causing the order of the court to be thwarted.

Ninthly, in many cases, the court will have to bear in mind that there are concurrent proceedings in another court based on either the same facts or some of the same facts, which are before the court on the contempt proceedings. They do have different purposes and often the overlap is not exact, but nevertheless the court will not want, in effect, the contender to suffer punishment twice for the same events.

My Lords, although criminal contempts of court may take a variety of forms they all share a common characteristic: they involve an interference with the due administration of justice either in a particular case or more generally as a continuing process. It is justice itself that is flouted by contempt of court not the individual court or judge who is attempting to administer it.

I find no problem in the concept that a decision or direction may have no immediate aim and no direct enforceability beyond the deciding and directing court, but yet may have such effect in connection with contempt of court. Merely to state, as is the law, that in general contempt of court is the improper interference with the due administration of justice is to state that it need not involve disobedience to an order binding upon the alleged contemnor.

For there can be no greater contempt than to intimidate a witness before he gives his evidence or to victimize him afterwards for having given it. How can we expect a witness to give his evidence freely and frankly, as he ought to do, if he is liable, as soon as the case is over, to be punished for it by those who dislike the evidence he has given? If this sort of thing could be done in a single case with impunity, the news of it would soon get round.