Copyright Law in UK Law

I have pointed out earlier in this judgment that the basis of the defence of public interest in a breach of confidence action cannot be the same as the basis of such defence to an action for infringement of copyright. In an action for breach of confidence the foundation of the action can fall away if that is required in the public interest, but that can never happen in a copyright action.

So for example, if Mr Jones had actually written a description of the pulsing, rotating cue, and synchronised power meter his description would (if not too trivial at least) be protected as a literary work. Similarly and more generally, a written work consisting of a specification of the functions of an intended computer program will attract protection as a literary work.

Generally speaking, in cases of artistic copyright, the more abstract and simple the copied idea, the less likely it is to constitute a substantial part. Originality, in the sense of the contribution of the author's skill and labour, tends to lie in the detail with which the basic idea is presented.

The purpose of the examination is not to see whether the overall appearance of the two designs is similar, but to judge whether the particular similarities relied on are sufficiently close, numerous or extensive to be more likely to be the result of copying than of coincidence. It is at this stage that similarities may be disregarded because they are commonplace, unoriginal, or consist of general ideas.

And if he does copy, the question whether he has copied a substantial part depends much more on the quality than on the quantity of what he has taken. But, in my view, that is only a short cut, and the more correct approach is first to determine whether the plaintiff's work as a whole is "original" and protected by copyright, and then to enquire whether the part taken by the defendant is substantial.

Whether a part is substantial must be decided by its quality rather than its quantity. The reproduction of a part which by itself has no originality will not normally be a substantial part of the copyright and therefore will not be protected. For that which would not attract copyright except by reason of its collocation will, when robbed of that collocation, not be a substantial part of the copyright and therefore the courts will not hold its reproduction to be an infringement.

As a separate argument, Mr Mellor contends that to treat the English copyright to these various Cuban works, composed by Cuban musicians, the title to which had been transferred by contracts executed in Cuba, mostly subject to Cuban law, as being unaffected by the Cuban Law 860 would be unrealistic on three grounds.