Corporate Criminal Liability in UK Law

"There is no doubt in my mind that BCCI has centralised its management, control and operations in the City. This is a UK- based bank, with its White House encompassing two buildings fronting Leadenhall Street and three at the rear. There is absolutely no way that we should continue the pretence that Luxembourg are the prime supervisors.

In our judgment the decision in Tesco does not provide the answer to the problem of construction before us. The answer must be found in the words of section 3(1) of the 1974 Act read in its contextual setting.

We are, of course, bound by these two decisions. But we have had the benefit of argument calling them into question. If we had to consider the matter de novo we would have still concluded that the words of section 3(1) are in context capable of one interpretation only, namely that subject to the defence of reasonable practicability, section 3(1) creates an absolute prohibition.

After all, as Stuart-Smith L.J. observed in Octel, section 3(1) is framed to achieve a result, namely that persons not employed are not exposed to risks to their health and safety by the conduct of the undertaking. If we accept British Steel's submission, it would be particularly easy for large industrial companies, engaged in multifarious hazardous operations, to escape liability on the basis that the company through its "directing mind" or senior management was not involved.

Mr Wood struggled valiantly to escape from the fact that the two verdicts cannot be reconciled having at the outset of his skeleton argument conceded that there was a logical inconsistency in the verdicts. In the view of this court what Mr Wood's submission came down to was that the jury may have had considerable sympathy for Mr Radcliffe and little sympathy for the appellants. We content ourselves with saying that if that indeed was the jury's approach then that was an improper approach.

Applying the test suggested, I am satisfied that, at the time that he went into the witness box in November 1989, Mr Sage did have the status necessary to make his evidence the evidence of Orion. In my judgment the two most important considerations are, first, that he was the witness, above all others, on whose evidence the success of Orion's case had come to depend.

The court should look at the substance of the transaction. It should look to see what genuine and proper services the party was to perform. It seems to me probable that, if the intention was that influence should be used to secure that a contract should be awarded, or awarded on terms, contrary to the interests, economic, national or other, of the awarding party, or without proper consideration of those interests by the awarding party, then there would be an abuse of influence.