Criminal Code in UK Law

But in a very large number of cases there is no clear indication either way. In such cases there has for centuries been a presumption that Parliament did not intend to make criminals of persons who were in no way blameworthy in what they did. That means that whenever a section is silent as to mens rea there is a presumption that, in order to give effect to the will of Parliament, we must read in words appropriate to require mens rea.

In the first place a stigma still attaches to any person convicted of a truly criminal offence, and the more serious or more disgraceful the offence the greater the stimga. So he would have to consider whether, in a case of this gravity, the public interest really requires that an innocent person should be prevented from proving his innocence in order that fewer guilty men may escape.

I would for my part question whether, as suggested on his behalf, the Director might not if so advised make a public statement on his prosecuting policy other than in the Code for Crown Prosecutors which he is obliged to issue by section 10 of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985. Plainly such a step would call for careful consultation and extreme circumspection, and could be taken only under the superintendence of the Attorney General (by virtue of section 3 of the 1985 Act).

Logical analysis forces the conclusion therefore that in the result there would in a civil action have been punishment for conduct not particularised in any criminal code and that such punishment had taken the form of a fine not receivable by the State but as a sort of bonus by a private individual who would apart from it be solaced for the wrong done to him.

In posing the case where someone is "really" threatened I use the word "really" in order to emphasise that duress must never be allowed to be the easy answer of those who can devise no other explanation of their conduct nor of those who readily could have avoided the dominance of threats nor of those who allow themselves to be at the disposal and under the sway of some gangster-tyrant. Where duress becomes an issue courts and juries will surely consider the facts with care and discernment.

A generous and purposive interpretation is to be given to constitutional provisions protecting human rights. The court has no licence to read its own predilections and moral values into the constitution, but it is required to consider the substance of the fundamental right at issue and ensure contemporary protection of that right in the light of evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society (see Trop v Dulles, above, at 101).

Under the second criterion, the court considers whether or not, under the law concerned, the 'offence' is one which applies generally to the public at large or is restricted to a specific group. On the other hand, where the offence is limited to a restricted group, as is generally the case in relation to disciplinary offences, the court is unlikely to classify a charge under the applicable disciplinary or regulatory code as criminal, at least unless it involves or may lead to loss of liberty.