Dangerous Driving in UK Law

The Court would like to emphasise this, that there is of course nothing in the Statute which requires the manner of the driving to be a substantial cause, or a major cause, or any other description of cause, of the accident. So long as the dangerous driving is a cause and something more than de minimis, the Statute operates.

In our view, applying this approach, it is therefore necessary for us to consider the meaning of cause as used in s.3ZB of the Road Traffic Act 1988 in the context of the intention of Parliament. First, the meaning of cause in death by dangerous driving was decided by Hennigan. That decision makes clear it is a cause if it is more than negligible or de minimis. We do not think that Parliament can have intended any different definition for s.3ZB.

It is designed to protect road users in the future from an offender who had shown himself to be a real risk on the roads. The Panel suggests the risk represented by the offender is reflected in the level of culpability which attaches to his driving so that matters relevant to fixing the length of the driving disqualification for the offence of causing death by dangerous driving will be much the same as those factors we have listed already.

Moreover, where a conviction has been arrived at by faithfully applying the law as it stood at the time, it can be set aside only by seeking exceptional leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal out of time. That court has power to grant such leave, and may do so if substantial injustice be demonstrated, but it will not do so simply because the law applied has now been declared to have been mistaken.

In order to justify a conviction there must be not only a situation which, viewed objectively, was dangerous, but there must also have been some fault on the part of the driver, causing that situation. Thus there is fault if an inexperienced or a naturally poor driver, while straining every nerve to do the right thing, falls below the standard of a competent and careful driver.

Lord Sumption has spelled out in Les Laboratoires Servier that the ex turpi causa defence is rooted in the public interest. The public interest is served by the approach I have indicated. It takes into account both the negligent driving for which Mr Bell is responsible and the dangerous driving for which Daniel is responsible It enables damages to be recovered for the negligence of Mr Bell but not for Daniel's own criminal conduct.

So section 3 takes care of the kind of inattention or misjudgment to which the ordinarily careful motorist is occasionally subject without its necessarily involving any moral turpitude, although it causes inconvenience and annoyance to other users of the road.