Deprivation of Liberty in UK Law

Leading Cases
  • P (by his litigation friend the Official Solicitor) v Cheshire West and Chester Council and another
    • Supreme Court
    • 19 Mar 2014

    The second question, therefore, is what is the essential character of a deprivation of liberty? It is common ground that three components can be derived from Storck, paras 74 and 89, confirmed in Stanev, paras 117 and 120, as follows: (a) the objective component of confinement in a particular restricted place for a not negligible length of time; (b) the subjective component of lack of valid consent; and (c) the attribution of responsibility to the state.

    If it would be a deprivation of my liberty to be obliged to live in a particular place, subject to constant monitoring and control, only allowed out with close supervision, and unable to move away without permission even if such an opportunity became available, then it must also be a deprivation of the liberty of a disabled person. The fact that my living arrangements are comfortable, and indeed make my life as enjoyable as it could possibly be, should make no difference.

  • Manchester City Council v (1) G (2) E (by The Official Solicitor) (3) F
    • Family Division
    • 26 Mar 2010

    That jurisprudence makes clear that when determining whether there is a “deprivation of liberty” within the meaning of Article 5, three conditions must be satisfied, namely (1) an objective element of a person's confinement in a particular restricted space for a not negligible time; (2) a subjective element, namely that the person has not validly consented to the confinement in question, and (3) the deprivation of liberty must be one for which the State is responsible: see Storck v Germany (2005) 43 EHRR 96 and JE v DE and Surrey CC [2006] EWHC 3459 (Fam) [2007] 2 FLR 1150.

  • Austin v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis
    • Queen's Bench Division
    • 23 Mar 2005

    It is not disputed that in order to determine whether there has been a deprivation of liberty, the starting-point must be the specific situation of the individual concerned and account must be taken of a whole range of factors arising in a particular case such as the type, duration, effects and manner of implementation of the measure in question.

  • Re A (A Child)(Deprivation of Liberty); C (Vulnerable Adult)(Deprivation of Liberty)
    • Family Division
    • 04 May 2010

    For present purposes I can summarise my conclusions as follows. Where the State – here, a local authority – knows or ought to know that a vulnerable child or adult is subject to restrictions on their liberty by a private individual that arguably give rise to a deprivation of liberty, then its positive obligations under Article 5 will be triggered.

  • Cheshire West and Chester Council v P (by his litigation friend the Official Solicitor)
    • Court of Appeal
    • 09 Nov 2011

    When used in these senses, it is legitimate, in my judgment, in determining whether or not there is a deprivation of liberty, to have regard both to the objective "reason" why someone is placed and treated as they are and also to the objective "purpose" (or "aim") of the placement. Subjective motives or intentions, on the other hand, are relevant only in the limited circumstances contemplated in Austin.

  • P (otherwise known as MIG) and another v Surrey County Council and Others
    • Court of Appeal
    • 28 Feb 2011

    As I have said, I do not consider it relevant to consider whether there has been an increase or a decrease in the degree of liberty allowed. The test is an objective one but the assessment must take account of the particular capabilities of the person concerned. What may be a deprivation of liberty for one person may not be for another. The question is whether the arrangements made by the state for this individual amount to a deprivation of his or her liberty.

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