Diminished Responsibility in UK Law

Accordingly when the sentencing court is assessing the seriousness of the offence with a view to fixing the minimum term, we can discern no logical reason why, subject to the specific element of reduced culpability inherent in the defence, the assessment of the seriousness of the instant offence of diminished responsibility manslaughter should ignore the guidance.

For such a verdict inexorably to follow, the unlawful act must be such as all sober and reasonable people would inevitably recognise must subject the other person to, at least, the risk of some harm resulting therefrom, albeit not serious harm.

In the present context notwithstanding the forensic difficulty of raising mutually inconsistent defences which involve denial of involvement in the killing on one hand, and diminished responsibility for the killing on the other, the trial process demands that the defendant, no doubt after considering legal advice, must decide which defence to advance. In an ideal world, of course, if he were responsible for the killing, he would admit it.

We have not overlooked the fact that by their verdict the jury rejected the defence of diminished responsibility and must therefore have not been satisfied to the requisite standard of the evidence of Drs Campbell and Hamilton. On this issue, however, the onus of proof was on the appellant. On the issue of provocation it was for the Crown to satisfy the jury that the appellant had not been provoked.

Section 2 of the 1957 Act only comes into play where all the ingredients of murder are established against the defendant. Section 2 of the 1957 Act only comes into play where all the ingredients of murder are established against the defendant.

In the present case the plaintiff has been convicted of a serious criminal offence. In such a case public policy would in our judgment preclude the court from entertaining the plaintiff's claim unless it could be said that he did not know the nature and quality of his act or that what he was doing was wrong. The offence of murder was reduced to one of manslaughter by reason of the plaintiff's mental disorder but his mental state did not justify a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.

The court ought not to allow itself to be made an instrument to enforce obligations alleged to arise out of the plaintiff's own criminal act and we would therefore allow the appeal on this ground.