Fraudulent Preference in UK Law

So far as concerns defendants who are within the jurisdiction of the court and have assets here, it is well-established that the court should not, in advance of any order or judgment, allow the creditor to seize any of the money or goods of the debtor or to use any legal process to do so. His proper remedy is to get judgment - under Order XIV if he can - and issue bankruptcy proceedings against the debtor. There are statements of the highest authority to this effect.

On the other hand, it may be helpful to summarise briefly the following conclusions that I have reached from the decided cases that I have reviewed: (1) The question whether a particular transaction is within the ordinary course of a company's business in the context of a floating charge is a mixed question of fact and law; (2) it is convenient to approach the matter in a two stage process; (3) first, to ascertain, as a matter of fact, whether an objective observer, with knowledge of the company, its memorandum of association and its business, would view the transaction as having taken place in the ordinary course of its business, and, if so (4) second, to consider whether, on the proper interpretation of the document creating the floating charge, applying standard techniques of interpretation, the parties nonetheless did not intend that the transaction should be regarded as being in the ordinary course of the company's business for the purpose of the charge; (5) subject to any such special considerations resulting from the proper interpretation of the charge document, there is no reason why an unprecedented or exceptional transaction cannot, in appropriate circumstances, be regarded as in the ordinary course of the company's business; (6) subject to any such special considerations, the mere fact that a transaction would, in a liquidation, be liable to be avoided as a fraudulent or otherwise wrongful preference of one creditor over others, does not, of itself, necessarily preclude the transaction from being in the ordinary course of the company's business; (7) nor does the mere fact that a transaction was made in breach of fiduciary duty by one or more directors of the company; (8) such matters in (6) and (7) may, however, where appropriate and in all the circumstances, be among the factors leading to the conclusion that the transaction was not in the ordinary course of the company's business; (9) transactions which are intended to bring to an end, or have the effect of bringing to an end, the company's business are not transactions in the ordinary course of its business.

Though the question of pressure in some form or another has, in the reported cases, often been the crux of the matter, it is plain that an inference of intention to prefer may be displaced in many other ways than by shoeing that the debtor acted under pressure.

The onus is only discharged when the Court upon a review of all the circumstances is satisfied that the dominant intent to prefer was present. That may be a matter of direct evidence or of inference, but where there is not direct evidence and there is room for more than one explanation it is not enough to say there being no direct evidence the intent to prefer must be inferred.

If the debtor was adjudicated bankrupt, then as from the date of the act of bankruptcy neither the debtor nor any such person claiming under him who could not bring himself within the protective provisions of the Bankruptcy Acts had any title at all; as from that date title was vested in the trustee. Outside the law of bankruptcy no similar ambulatory title was known to the law.