Freezing Order in UK Law

I have to say that, if that has become the practice, then the practice should be reconsidered. It is appropriate in each case for the court to scrutinise with care whether what is alleged to have been the dishonesty of the person against whom the order is sought in itself really justifies the inference that that person has assets which he is likely to dissipate unless restricted.

There must be a real risk, judged objectively, that a future judgment would not be met because of unjustifiable dissipation of assets. Solid evidence will be required to support a conclusion that relief is justified, although precisely what this entails in any given case will necessarily vary according to the individual circumstances: see e.g Gee on Commercial Injunctions (6th edition) in particular at 12–032 – 34 and 12–042 and the cases there cited.

In any event I am satisfied that in relation to assets such as balances in bank accounts an “ordinary course of business” exception is inappropriate in the post-judgment environment. I respectfully adopt the reasoning of Colman J at page 412 of the Soinco case which I have set out above. That was of course a case concerned with a receivership order rather than a freezing order, but it seems to me that those considerations apply a fortiori to a post-judgment freezing injunction.

First, that the time has come for the English Courts to recognise, consistently with the carefully considered conclusion of the High Court of Australia, that the jurisdiction to grant freezing orders against third parties is not rigidly restricted by the Chabrarequirement to show that, at the time when the order is sought, the third party is already holding or in control of assets beneficially owned by the defendant.

Although Palmer v. Carey concerned contractual arrangements made between the parties out of court, in our judgment Lord Wrenbury's statement of principle applies directly to consent orders, such as the February Order and the March Order, which embody terms agreed between the parties; and also indirectly, by analogy, to other court orders.

This is not, in my view, a partial definition of the preceding words. And it makes it clear that “the Respondent's assets” can include assets held by a foreign trust or a Liechtenstein Anstalt when the defendant retains beneficial ownership or effective control of the asset.