Freezing Order in UK Law

I have to say that, if that has become the practice, then the practice should be reconsidered. It is appropriate in each case for the court to scrutinise with care whether what is alleged to have been the dishonesty of the person against whom the order is sought in itself really justifies the inference that that person has assets which he is likely to dissipate unless restricted.

There must be a real risk, judged objectively, that a future judgment would not be met because of unjustifiable dissipation of assets. Solid evidence will be required to support a conclusion that relief is justified, although precisely what this entails in any given case will necessarily vary according to the individual circumstances: see e.g Gee on Commercial Injunctions (6th edition) in particular at 12–032 – 34 and 12–042 and the cases there cited.

Although Palmer v. Carey concerned contractual arrangements made between the parties out of court, in our judgment Lord Wrenbury's statement of principle applies directly to consent orders, such as the February Order and the March Order, which embody terms agreed between the parties; and also indirectly, by analogy, to other court orders.

First, although it is an invasion of privacy to force any party to disclose assets, a freezing order in normal circumstances simply cannot be effective without that disclosure. Once one has the situation which did exist in this case, which was that on 13 June it was accepted that the freezing order should continue, then prima facie David Steel J is right in saying that a disclosure provision would be the normal provision so that that freezing order can be properly policed and be effective.

There is therefore obviously substantial room for argument that the fact that the money is to be effectively controlled by the Court means that the Court should regard it in the same way as it would regard assets frozen by the freezing order, particularly as the money was paid into the joint account effectively in substitution for, or to discharge, the freezing order.

First, that the time has come for the English Courts to recognise, consistently with the carefully considered conclusion of the High Court of Australia, that the jurisdiction to grant freezing orders against third parties is not rigidly restricted by the Chabrarequirement to show that, at the time when the order is sought, the third party is already holding or in control of assets beneficially owned by the defendant.

This is not, in my view, a partial definition of the preceding words. And it makes it clear that “the Respondent's assets” can include assets held by a foreign trust or a Liechtenstein Anstalt when the defendant retains beneficial ownership or effective control of the asset.