Functus Officio in UK Law

Leading Cases
  • Terry v Coroner for East Sussex
    • Court of Appeal (Civil Division)
    • 12 Jul 2001

    I cannot accept that the s.19 procedure takes the place of an inquest. No doubt the registration of the death on the basis of an ascertained and certified cause following a statutorily bespoken post-mortem examination provides a firmer foundation for the decision not to hold an inquest than a mere decision to that effect taken under s.8. In short, I prefer the view expressed by Dr Burton as the editor of Halsbury's Laws to that expressed in Jervis.

  • R v Cripps, ex parte Muldoon
    • Court of Appeal (Civil Division)
    • 03 Abr 1984

    However, once the order has been perfected, the trial judge is functus officio and, in his capacity as the trial judge, has no further power to reconsider or vary his decisions whether under the authority of the "slip rule" or otherwise. The "slip rule" power is not a power granted to the trial judge as such. It is one of the powers of the court, exercisable by a judge of the court who may or may not be the judge who was in fact the trail judge.

  • R v McCluskey
    • Court of Appeal (Criminal Division)
    • 27 May 1993

    Enquiries made in this case clearly did not offend against Section 8 and counsel for the Crown who initiated those enquiries took precautions to ensure that they did not. If it is open to the prosecution to set in train enquiries of individual jurors, then why not the defence? And if the parties may do this (provided they do not infringe Section 8), why not others? In such cases, therefore, the consent of the Court of Appeal should be sought.

  • Carleton (Earl of Malmesbury) v Strutt & Parker (A Partnership)
    • Queen's Bench Division
    • 24 Abr 2008

    It is well-established by a number of recent cases as well as others of greater age that where a judgment has been delivered, either orally or by handing down, the judge may in appropriate circumstances alter it at any time prior to an order giving effect to the judgment. Once there is such an order the judge is functus officio and the only way forward for a dissatisfied party is to appeal.

  • Carter (t/a Michael Carter Partnership) v Harold Simpson Associates (Architects) Ltd
    • Privy Council
    • 14 Jun 2004

    There is no rule that a remittal under section 11 necessarily means that the award ceases to have any effect and that the parties start with a clean sheet. The general principle is that the powers and duties of the arbitrator cannot exceed what is necessary to give effect to the order for remittal. If the award is remitted for one specific purpose, such as to amend a name, the arbitrator has no power to amend the award in any other way: see Howett v Clements (1845) 1 CB 128.

  • Barke v SEETEC Business Technology Centre Ltd
    • Court of Appeal (Civil Division)
    • 16 May 2005

    Even if there were no power to request further reasons pursuant to rule 30, the employment appeal tribunal would in our view be acting lawfully in inviting the employment tribunal to clarify, supplement or give its written reasons. As we have said, there is no prohibition in the statute or rules against such a request.

  • R v Medway
    • Court of Appeal (Criminal Division)
    • 06 Nov 1975

    We are satisfied and hold that there is no such jurisdiction In our judgment the kernel of what has been described as the "nullity test" is that the Court is satisfied that the abandonment was not the result of a deliberate and informed decision, in other words that the mind of the applicant did not go with his act of abandonment.

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