Functus Officio in UK Law

Enquiries made in this case clearly did not offend against Section 8 and counsel for the Crown who initiated those enquiries took precautions to ensure that they did not. If it is open to the prosecution to set in train enquiries of individual jurors, then why not the defence? And if the parties may do this (provided they do not infringe Section 8), why not others? In such cases, therefore, the consent of the Court of Appeal should be sought.

However, once the order has been perfected, the trial judge is functus officio and, in his capacity as the trial judge, has no further power to reconsider or vary his decisions whether under the authority of the "slip rule" or otherwise. The "slip rule" power is not a power granted to the trial judge as such. It is one of the powers of the court, exercisable by a judge of the court who may or may not be the judge who was in fact the trail judge.

I cannot accept that the s.19 procedure takes the place of an inquest. No doubt the registration of the death on the basis of an ascertained and certified cause following a statutorily bespoken post-mortem examination provides a firmer foundation for the decision not to hold an inquest than a mere decision to that effect taken under s.8. In short, I prefer the view expressed by Dr Burton as the editor of Halsbury's Laws to that expressed in Jervis.

It is well-established by a number of recent cases as well as others of greater age that where a judgment has been delivered, either orally or by handing down, the judge may in appropriate circumstances alter it at any time prior to an order giving effect to the judgment. Once there is such an order the judge is functus officio and the only way forward for a dissatisfied party is to appeal.

Secondly, the essential task of the court is to judge the new case afresh and on its merits and decide, in accordance with sections 84 and 85, what order would be appropriate in the new circumstances. Having established the facts, the court would be obliged to ask itself whether or not, on grounds 1 to 8, for example, it would be reasonable to make an order for possession on one of those grounds and, if so, whether it would then be right to postpone that date for possession.

Even if there were no power to request further reasons pursuant to rule 30, the employment appeal tribunal would in our view be acting lawfully in inviting the employment tribunal to clarify, supplement or give its written reasons. As we have said, there is no prohibition in the statute or rules against such a request.

I would agree with Clarke LJ in Stewart v Engel [2000] 1 WLR 2268, 2282 that his overriding objective must be to deal with the case justly. A relevant factor must be whether any party has acted upon the decision to his detriment, especially in a case where it is expected that they may do so before the order is formally drawn up. Every case is going to depend upon its particular circumstances.