Functus Officio in UK Law

Leading Cases
  • Terry v Coroner for East Sussex
    • Court of Appeal (Civil Division)
    • 12 Julio 2001

    I cannot accept that the s.19 procedure takes the place of an inquest. No doubt the registration of the death on the basis of an ascertained and certified cause following a statutorily bespoken post-mortem examination provides a firmer foundation for the decision not to hold an inquest than a mere decision to that effect taken under s.8. In short, I prefer the view expressed by Dr Burton as the editor of Halsbury's Laws to that expressed in Jervis.

  • R v McCluskey
    • Court of Appeal (Criminal Division)
    • 27 Mayo 1993

    Enquiries made in this case clearly did not offend against Section 8 and counsel for the Crown who initiated those enquiries took precautions to ensure that they did not. Nonetheless, we are concerned by what occurred. If it is open to the prosecution to set in train enquiries of individual jurors, then why not the defence? And if the parties may do this (provided they do not infringe Section 8), why not others? To permit such enquiries seems to us to threaten the secrecy of the jury room.

  • R v Cripps, ex parte Muldoon
    • Court of Appeal (Civil Division)
    • 03 Abril 1984

    However, once the order has been perfected, the trial judge is functus officio and, in his capacity as the trial judge, has no further power to reconsider or vary his decisions whether under the authority of the "slip rule" or otherwise. The "slip rule" power is not a power granted to the trial judge as such. It is one of the powers of the court, exercisable by a judge of the court who may or may not be the judge who was in fact the trail judge.

  • Manchester City Council v Joleen Finn
    • Court of Appeal (Civil Division)
    • 19 Diciembre 2002

    Secondly, the essential task of the court is to judge the new case afresh and on its merits and decide, in accordance with sections 84 and 85, what order would be appropriate in the new circumstances. Having established the facts, the court would be obliged to ask itself whether or not, on grounds 1 to 8, for example, it would be reasonable to make an order for possession on one of those grounds and, if so, whether it would then be right to postpone that date for possession.

  • Carleton (Earl of Malmesbury) v Strutt & Parker (A Partnership)
    • Queen's Bench Division
    • 24 Abril 2008

    It is well-established by a number of recent cases as well as others of greater age that where a judgment has been delivered, either orally or by handing down, the judge may in appropriate circumstances alter it at any time prior to an order giving effect to the judgment. Once there is such an order the judge is functus officio and the only way forward for a dissatisfied party is to appeal.

  • Barke v SEETEC Business Technology Centre Ltd
    • Court of Appeal (Civil Division)
    • 16 Mayo 2005

    Even if there were no power to request further reasons pursuant to rule 30, the employment appeal tribunal would in our view be acting lawfully in inviting the employment tribunal to clarify, supplement or give its written reasons. As we have said, there is no prohibition in the statute or rules against such a request.

  • R v Medway
    • Court of Appeal (Criminal Division)
    • 06 Noviembre 1975

    We are satisfied and hold that there is no such jurisdiction In our judgment the kernel of what has been described as the "nullity test" is that the Court is satisfied that the abandonment was not the result of a deliberate and informed decision, in other words that the mind of the applicant did not go with his act of abandonment.

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