Gender Discrimination in UK Law

This is because, as I see it, cases of direct discrimination under section 1(1)( a) can be considered by asking the simple question: would the complainant have received the same treatment from the defendant but for his or her sex?

I then raised with the Claimant if that is the case, what else can be done to ameliorate the historic discrimination and I am satisfied that there is no other remedy available to him within the British Nationality Act 1981, as amended. He, of course, is no longer a child under 18 and therefore cannot pursue a claim for discretionary registration.

There may be such an obvious, relevant difference between the claimant and those with whom he seeks to compare himself that their situations cannot be regarded as analogous. Then the court's scrutiny may best be directed at considering whether the differentiation has a legitimate aim and whether the means chosen to achieve the aim is appropriate and not disproportionate in its adverse impact.

In its judgments the European Court of Human Rights often refers to "very weighty reasons" being required to justify discrimination on these particularly sensitive grounds. Where an individual lives is in principle a matter of choice. So although it can be regarded as a personal characteristic it is not immutable.

To identify a social group, one must first identify the society of which it forms a part. Within that society, it seems to me that women form a social group of the kind contemplated by the Convention. Discrimination against women in matters of fundamental human rights on the ground that they are women is plainly in pari materiae with discrimination on grounds of race. It offends against their rights as human beings to equal treatment and respect.

Whilst I accept Mr Pointer's submission that the judge has a duty to assess each and every one of the section 25(2) criteria that bear on outcome and equally that judges of the Family Division have great expertise in making value judgments, I do not accept that the duty requires a detailed critical appraisal of the performance of each of the parties during the marriage.

Examples cited of the mother who cares for a handicapped child seem to me both theoretical and distasteful. Such sacrifices and achievements are the product of love and commitment and are not to be counted in cash. At the same time she risks the outcome of failure and so earns her entitlement to share in the successful outcome.