Hate Speech in UK Law

Leading Cases
  • R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Simms
    • House of Lords
    • 08 July 1999
    “

    The value of free speech in a particular case must be measured in specifics. For example, no prisoner would ever be permitted to have interviews with a journalist to publish pornographic material or to give vent to so-called hate speech. The prisoners are in prison because they are presumed to have been properly convicted. In principle it is not easy to conceive of a more important function which free speech might fulfil.

    Fundamental rights cannot be overridden by general or ambiguous words. This is because there is too great a risk that the full implications of their unqualified meaning may have passed unnoticed in the democratic process. In the absence of express language or necessary implication to the contrary, the courts therefore presume that even the most general words were intended to be subject to the basic rights of the individual.

  • R (Mellor) v Secretary of State for the Home Department
    • Court of Appeal (Civil Division)
    • 03 May 2001
    “

    On considering the speeches as a whole, however, I have concluded that they recognised that a degree of restriction of the right of expression was a justifiable element in imprisonment, not merely in order to accommodate the orderly running of a prison, but as part of the penal objective of deprivation of liberty. How far freedom of expression could justifiably be restricted was a question of proportionality.

    The approach under the Strasbourg jurisprudence and under English domestic law is the same. The consequences that the punishment of imprisonment has on the exercise of human rights are justifiable provided that they are not disproportionate to the aim of maintaining a penal system designed both to punish and to deter. When the consequences are disproportionate, special arrangements may be called for to mitigate the normal effect of deprivation of liberty.

  • EM (Zimbabwe) v Secretary of State for the Home Department
    • Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber)
    • 14 January 2011
    “

    (5) A returnee to Harare will in general face no significant difficulties, if going to a low-density or medium-density area. (5) A returnee to Harare will in general face no significant difficulties, if going to a low-density or medium-density area.

    As for Harare, whilst it may be reasonably likely that ZANU-PF militias etc would be bussed in to that city in order to cause problems during an election campaign, the present evidence is such that it would be merely speculative to conclude this would have a material impact upon those living in low-density areas.

  • NT 1 and another v Google LLC (Information Commissioner intervening)
    • Queen's Bench Division
    • 13 April 2018
    “

    In summary, a defendant who is sued for defamation in respect of a publication imputing the commission by the claimant of a criminal offence which is the subject of a spent conviction can rely on any reporting privilege that may exist and/or on a defence of truth or honest opinion, unless the publication is proved to have been made with malice. In defamation, a conviction is conclusive proof of guilt, against a claimant: Civil Evidence Act 1968, s 13.

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