Implied Consent in UK Law

"But so widely drawn a principle must inevitably be subject to exceptions. But, apart from these special instances where the control or constraint is lawful, a broader exception has been created to allow for the exigencies of everyday life. Generally speaking, consent is a defence to battery; and most of the physical contacts of ordinary life are not actionable because they are impliedly consented to by all who move in society and so expose themselves to the risk of bodily contact.

Moreover, on general principles, it would in my judgment be a plain interference with or usurpation of an owner's rights by the customer if he were to remove a label which the owner had placed on goods or put another label on. It would be a trespass to goods and it would be usurping the owner's rights, for only he would have any right to do such an act and no one could contend that there was any implied consent or authority to a customer to do any such thing.

Nevertheless it is clear that the plaintiffs made the documents available for a limited purpose only, namely to assist in the conduct first of a criminal investigation and then of a criminal trial. This action by the plaintiffs, looked at objectively as it must be, cannot be construed as a waiver of any rights available to them in the present civil action for the purpose of which the privilege exists.

It depends on the broad principle of equity that he who has received information in confidence shall not take unfair advantage of it. He must not make use of it to the prejudice of him who gave it without obtaining his consent. He should go to the public source and get it: or, at any rate, not be in a better position than if he had gone to the public source. He should not get a start over others by using the information which he received in confidence.

In those cases it was held that the use by the squatter was, as a matter of law, to be treated as enjoyed with the implied consent of the paper owner.

What is crucial is to understand that, without the requisite intention, in law there can be no possession. Such intention may be, and frequently is, deduced from the physical acts themselves. But there is no doubt in my judgment that there are two separate elements in legal possession. It is not the nature of the acts which A does but the intention with which he does them which determines whether or not he is in possession.

In this context, that means reasonably necessary for the establishment or protection of an arbitrating party's legal rights vis-a-vis a third party in order to found a cause of action against that third party or to defend a claim (or counterclaim) brought by the third party (see Hassleh).