Indecent Assault in UK Law

But that was not the situation here, and on the facts of this case we think plainly it would have been a wrong exercise of discretion not to leave this question of indecent assault to the jury, because this was a case where the appellant himself had given evidence and had said on oath 'True I did not have intercourse, but I did do that which amounts to an indecent assault'.

If he did not intend to do this, he is entitled to be found not guilty; and if he did not so intend because he believed she was consenting, the prosecution will have failed to prove the charge. It is the defendant's belief, not the grounds on which it was based, which goes to negative the intent.

We do, however, think it necessary to consider two of them because of what was said in the judgments. The offence charged was assaulting a police officer in the execution of his duty, contrary to section 51 of the Police Act, 1964. The defendant, in his defence, contended, inter alia, that he had not believed the police officer to be such and in consequence had resisted arrest. His counsel analysed the offence in the same way as we have done and referred to the reasoning in Morgan.

The issues addressed in these cases were the result of two things: the increase in the maximum penalty for indecent assault from two years' imprisonment to 10, enacted by section 3(3) of the Sexual Offences Act 1985; and the practice of prosecutors to lay charges under section 14 when the time for doing so under section 6 had expired. In R v Hinton (1994) 16 Cr App R(S) 523 it did so because the section 6 time limit had expired.

So long as the examination is carried out for genuine medical purposes in a manner and in circumstances consistent with those purposes, then in our view the fact that the doctor or midwife happens to have some secret indecent motive, or happens to obtain some sexual B gratification known only to himself from carrying out his legitimate work, cannot, in our view render the circumstances indecent.

The Act bars consent from preventing an act being an indecent assault. Hence, if the act alleged to constitute the assault is itself an indecent act, consent will not avail. But in the present case the touching, which was merely to indicate a pose, was not of itself indecent, and was consented to. Consent, therefore, does avail to prevent it being an assault and the question of indecency does not arise.

It does not seem to this Court right or desirable that one and the same incident should be made the subject matter of distinct charges, so that hereafter it may appear to those not familiar with the circumstances that two entirely separate offences were committed. Were this permitted generally, a single offence could frequently give rise to a multiplicity of charges and great unfairness could ensue.