Judicial Review Delay in UK Law

It may therefore be a helpful further pointer to the true construction of the section to ask the question, "Is the decision sought to be reviewed one arising in the issue between the Crown and the defendant formulated by the indictment (including the costs of such issue)?" It may therefore be a helpful further pointer to the true construction of the section to ask the question, "Is the decision sought to be reviewed one arising in the issue between the Crown and the defendant formulated by the indictment (including the costs of such issue)?"

The court therefore still retains a discretion to refuse to grant leave for the making of the application or the relief sought on the substantive application on the grounds of undue delay, if it considers that the granting of the relief sought would be likely to cause substantial hardship to, or substantially, prejudice the rights of, any person or would be detrimental to good administration.

It follows that, when an application for leave to apply is not made promptly and in any event within three months, the court may refuse leave on the ground of delay unless it considers that there is good reason for extending the period; but, even if it considers that there is such good reason, it may still refuse leave (or, where leave has been granted, substantive relief) if in its opinion the granting of the relief sought would be likely to cause hardship or prejudice (as specified in section 31(6)) or would be detrimental to good administration.

(4) The ordinary rule now is that the court will refuse leave to claim judicial review unless satisfied that there is an arguable ground for judicial review having a realistic prospect of success and not subject to a discretionary bar such as delay or an alternative remedy: R v Legal Aid Board, Ex p Hughes (1992) 5 Admin LR 623, 628; Fordham, Judicial Review Handbook, 4th ed (2004), p 426. But arguability cannot be judged without reference to the nature and gravity of the issue to be argued.

If proceedings of a type which would normally be brought by judicial review are instead brought by bringing an ordinary claim, the court in deciding whether the commencement of the proceedings is an abuse of process can take into account whether there has been unjustified delay in initiating the proceedings.

My fourth proposition is that a remedy by way of judicial review is not to be made available where an alternative remedy exists. Judicial review is a collateral challenge: it is not an appeal. Where Parliament has provided by statute appeal procedures, as in the taxing statutes, it will only be very rarely that the courts will allow the collateral process of judicial review to be used to attack an appealable decision.

It follows, as it always does when a potential applicant for judicial review expeditiously seeks a reasonable way of resolving the issue without litigation, that the court will lean against penalising him for the passage of time and will where appropriate enlarge time if the alternative expedient fails.