Legal Aid Sentencing and Punishment in UK Law

The final issue arises out of the Judge's order for costs, namely that the respondents should pay 60% of the appellants' costs. The appellants' costs at first instance consisted of three components, as permitted by the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 as amended by sections 27–31 in Part II of the Access to Justice Act 1999.

The amount of the base costs in this case is however dwarfed by the total potentially recoverable costs, which are nearly three times as much.

It therefore follows that, if the action now under appeal had been the subject of a judgment after 1 April 2013, the proper award of general damages would be 10% higher than that agreed in this case, namely £22,000 rather than £20,000.

So, in order to obtain legal aid, he must secure an "exceptional case determination" under section 10 of that Act. Even if an appellant abroad secured legal representation from one source or another, he and his lawyer would face formidable difficulties in giving and receiving instructions both prior to the hearing and in particular (as I will explain) during the hearing.

It is true that the test for article 8 as it is stated in the Strasbourg jurisprudence (whether those affected have been involved in the decision-making process, viewed as a whole, to a degree sufficient to provide them with the requisite protection of their interests) differs from the test for article 6(1) (whether there has been effective access to court).

If the Court upheld this ground, it would have the effect of preventing the Defendant from laying an order before Parliament unless or until he had undertaken a consultation exercise, even though there was no statutory duty to consult, because otherwise he would be acting unlawfully. Thus, the consequence of allowing the Claimant's claim was an interference by the Court with Parliamentary proceedings, which was contrary to Parliamentary privilege and the separation of powers.

The power to add, vary or omit services under s.9 as supplemented by s.41 is to serve and promote the object of the statute. The power cannot be construed in a way which widens the purposes of the Act or departs from or varies its primary objective (see, e.g., Utah Construction and Engineering PTY Limited v Pataky [1966] AC 629 at 640 and Bennion on Statutory Interpretation 5 th Edition section 59, pages 262–263).