Misrepresentation Deceit in UK Law

It must be shown that the defendant made a materially false representation which was intended to, and did, induce the representee to act to its detriment. To my mind it is not necessary, as a matter of law, to prove that the representee believed that the representation was true. For example, if the representee does not believe that the representation is true, he may have serious difficulty in establishing that he was induced to enter into the contract or that he has suffered loss as a result.

It seems to me that there are six significant elements that make up the torts alleged in this case, ie. First there is the situation in MCB during the period 1991 to 2002 as it actually existed; were there irregularities and failures in regulation and did officers and directors of MCB know of them? Secondly, there is the completion of the Proposal Form by the directors and officers of MCB, which is said to have been done fraudulently.

The antecedent facts concerning the true situation in MCB are important, but it is what is done with those facts that really matters so far as the tort of fraudulent misrepresentation or deceit is concerned. In short, it is (on the assumptions I have made) MCB's decision not to tell the facts as they are and to continue to mislead that matters most, not the true facts themselves.

In order to determine whether any and if so what representation was made by a statement requires (1) construing the statement in the context in which it was made, and (2) interpreting the statement objectively according to the impact it might be expected to have on a reasonable representee in the position and with the known characteristics of the actual representee: see Raiffeisen, supra, at [81]; Kyle Bay Ltd v Underwriters Subscribing under Policy No. 01957/08/01 [2007] Lloyd's Rep IR 460, 466, at [30]–[33], per Neuberger LJ.

In a deceit case it is also necessary that the representor should understand that he is making the implied representation and that it had the misleading sense alleged. A person cannot make a fraudulent statement unless he is aware that he is making that statement. In other cases of misrepresentation this is not a requirement, but one would generally expect it to be reasonably apparent to both representor and representee that the implied representation alleged was being made.

The Judge was wrong to ask how they would have acted if they had been told the truth. They were told lies in order to induce them to enter into the contract The lies were material and successful; they induced the Plaintiffs to act to their detriment and contract with Mr Chappell.

Where the plaintiff's action in truth arises directly ex turpi causa, he is likely to fail, as he did in Alexander v. Rayson, [1936] 1 King's Bench 182; J.M. Allan (Merchandising) Ltd v. Cloke, [1963] 2 Queen's Bench 340; Ashmore, Benson, Pease & Co, Ltd. v. A.V. Dawson Ltd. [1973] 1 Weekly Law Reports 828; and Thackwell v. Barclays Bank plc, [1986] 1 All England Reports, 676. Where the plaintiff has suffered a genuine wrong, to which allegedly unlawful conduct is incidental, he is likely to succeed, as he did in Bowmakers Ltd. v. Barnet Instruments Ltd.