Money Laundering in UK Law

It will seldom, if ever, be contradicted by the documentary evidence on which it is founded. That may not, of itself, make the claim a complex claim but there is, subject to Mr Lissack's second submission, no reason why the bank should not be required to prove the important fact of suspicion in the ordinary way at trial by first making relevant disclosure and then calling either primary or secondary evidence from relevant witnesses.

The truth is that Parliament has struck a precise and workable balance of conflicting interests in the 2002 Act. It is, of course, true that to intervene between a banker and his customer in the performance of the contract of mandate is a serious interference with the free flow of trade. But Parliament has considered that a limited interference is to be tolerated in preference to allowing the undoubted evil of money-laundering to run rife in the commercial community.

Reasonable grounds for believing a primary fact, such as that the person under investigation has benefited from his criminal conduct, or has committed a money laundering offence, do not involve proving that he has done such a thing, whether to the criminal or civil standard of proof. The test is concerned not with proof but the existence of grounds (reasons) for believing (thinking) something, and with the reasonableness of those grounds.

For the purposes of sections 240 and 241(1) and (2) a description of the conduct in relatively general terms should suffice, "importing and supplying controlled drugs", "trafficking women for the purpose of prostitution", "brothel keeping", "money laundering" are all examples of conduct which, if it occurs in the United Kingdom is unlawful under the criminal law.

I respectfully agree with and adopt the above cited observations of Sullivan J, Langley J and King J and if support is needed it is to be found in the decision of the Court of Appeal, Criminal Division in R –v—Anwoir & Others [2008] 2 Cr App R 36 at para 21 at page 539 that there are two ways in which the Crown can prove in money laundering offences that property was derived from crime —either by proving it derived from unlawful conduct of a specific kind or kinds or by evidence of the circumstances in which the property was handled, such as to give rise to the irresistible inference that it could only have been derived from crime (although in criminal proceedings the higher standard of proof is required).

I have made specific findings of fact in the course of this judgment – see paragraphs 54, 55, 57, 65, 66, 72, 73, 76, 78, 84, 89, 90, 93, 97, 99, 100, 103, 104, 109, 111, 115, 116, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 132, 134 and 136 —and so at the risk of some repetition, I am in no doubt that DG and TG engaged in unlawful conduct – in DG's case, money laundering and drug trafficking, in TG's case, money laundering. There is also evidence of tax evasion in four jurisdictions.

I have held that Mr Meduri and Ms Ciserani believed that Notable had asked the appropriate questions and had been give adequate answers. At that stage, it is clear that Mr Landman genuinely wanted that advice and expected Notable to follow it. Mr Landman also knew that at the end of the process, Mr Meduri and Ms Ciserani were satisfied with the outcome and that they were entitled to proceed on the basis that Mr Nobre was able to deal with the money as his own.