Nullity of Marriage in UK Law

In such circumstances, there exists nothing here in English law susceptible to a decree of nullity under S.11 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. There was a wholesale failure to comply with the formal requirements of English law. This was not, as submitted, a void marriage but was, in shorthand, a 'non-marriage'.

There are two principles which inform the modern legislation. One is the public interest that spouses, to the extent that their means permit, should provide for themselves and their children. The law now encourages spouses to avoid bitterness after family break-down and to settle their money and property problems. An object of the modern law is to encourage each to put the past behind them and to begin a new life which is not overshadowed by the relationship which has broken down.

(g) in the Case of proceedings for divorce or nullity of marriage, the value to either of the parties to the marriage of any benefit (for example, a pension) which, by reason of the dissolution or annulment of the marriage, that party will lose the chance of acquiring:

and so to exercise those powers as to place the parties, so far as it is practicable and, having regard to their conduct, just to do so, in the financial position in which they would have been if the marriage had not broken down and each had properly discharged his or her financial obligations and responsibilities towards the other."

The parties' matrimonial home, even if this was brought into the marriage at the outset by one of the parties, usually has a central place in any marriage. So it should normally be treated as matrimonial property for this purpose. As already noted, in principle the entitlement of each party to a share of the matrimonial property is the same however long or short the marriage may have been.

Like my noble and learned friend, I find much more difficulty in deciding the order which it is appropriate for the House to make in a case such as the present. In Ridge v. Baldwin ( supra), a majority of the House, in not dissimilar circumstances, granted a declaration that the decision of the Chief Constable was "void". This was the language adopted by the Court of Appeal in the instant case.

It would make a nonsense of the use of an implied undertaking if information about the means of a party, in some cases sensitive information, could be made public as soon as the substantive hearing commenced. Information disclosed under the compulsion of ancillary relief proceedings is, in my judgment, protected by the implied undertaking, before, during and after the proceedings are completed.